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As cyber vulnerabilities proliferate with the expansion of connected
devices, wherein security is often forsaken for ease of use, Special
Operations Forces (SOF) cannot escape the obvious, massive risk that
they are assuming by incorporating emerging technologies into their
toolkits. This is especially true in the maritime sector where SOF operates nearshore in littoral zones. As SOF—in support to the U.S. Navy—
increasingly operate in these contested maritime environments, they
will gradually encounter more hostile actors looking to exploit digital
vulnerabilities. As such, this monograph comes at a perfect time as the
world becomes more interconnected but also more vulnerable.
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Foreword

I

n 2021, the world took notice of the frailty of our interdependent supply
chain networks. The Suez Canal, which is one of the busiest trade routes
in the world, was closed for almost a week due to the massive container ship,
Ever Given, becoming stuck after a sandstorm caused visibility to plummet.
The dirty secret to this episode: the same effect could have been achieved
via cyberspace by infiltrating the ship’s integrated technological systems.
An ill-intentioned hacker could have achieved the same effect by slightly
altering data in the ship’s navigation systems.
The vulnerability of maritime transportation systems, like that of the
overall vulnerability of supply chain networks, has long been a source of
concern within the cybersecurity community. As more devices are attached
to the internet, and as more actors come online to exploit digital vulnerabilities, discovering gaps in maritime digital security is becoming increasingly
common. The recognition of these gaps in cybersecurity led to the December 2020 release of the National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan by the White
House National Security Council. Although this plan will not instantly solve
a long-standing problem, it does streamline federal cybersecurity standards
for maritime transportation systems. Here, cyberspace risk hides in plain
sight: the opacity of operational technology masks risk, thereby allowing
malign actors to exploit networked systems.
As cyber vulnerabilities proliferate with the expansion of connected
devices, wherein security is often forsaken for ease of use, Special Operations Forces (SOF) cannot escape the obvious and massive risk they are
assuming by incorporating emerging technologies into their toolkits. This
is especially true in the maritime sector where SOF operates nearshore in
littoral zones (LZ). As SOF—in support of the U.S. Navy irregular warfare
(IW) mission—increasingly operate in these contested maritime environments, they will gradually encounter more hostile actors looking to exploit
digital vulnerabilities. As such, this monograph comes at a perfect time as
the world becomes more interconnected but also more vulnerable.
The monograph’s authors, Gary Kessler and Diane Zorri, not only articulate the various vectors of digital compromise but also explicate how various
maritime systems work and include real world examples of compromise. The
vii

authors aim to reach a broad audience, not just those involved in the maritime
domain. Hence, Kessler and Zorri start each chapter discussing what relationship
SOF has to a particular digital tool. They then define what each digital tool is
and provide case studies. The authors end each chapter with concluding observations that bring together and summarize the entire chapter. These concluding
observations are particularly helpful and quick takeaways for the executive that
cannot read the entire monograph.
The authors of this fantastic volume provide the SOF reader with three key
takeaways: competitive advantage, maritime IW, and technology vulnerabilities.
Readers will agree that these takeaways ultimately provide both opportunities
and risks for SOF, and that by confronting these takeaways early, SOF will be
better positioned to compete globally in the future.
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities will not go away. Therefore, it is up to SOF
to reduce the magnitude of its own digital vulnerabilities while exploiting the
vulnerabilities of its adversaries. Reading this monograph is a good place to start
on understanding just how SOF can achieve that objective.

Mark G. Grzegorzewski, Ph.D.
Professor, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies
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Introduction
A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for.
- John A. Shedd1

U

nited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has identified several emerging threats to U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF).
These include, but are not limited to strategic sabotage, vulnerability to missile attacks, and innovative uses of technology by state and non-state competitors.2 These threats highlight the importance for Special Operations
Forces (SOF) to maintain the competitive advantage in support of U.S. Navy
irregular warfare (IW), especially across globally contested domains, such
as coastal and near-coastal environments.
If the threats above can be viewed as independent “vertical” vectors, the
cybersecurity threat vector would be the “horizontal” that ties them together.
Cyber and other electronic threats particularly in the maritime domain, have
grown dramatically over the last decade. More and more actors are using
cyber threats as a line of effort against U.S. naval forces and their components. Malign actors understand that the maritime realm depends upon
automation, and they seek to exploit vulnerabilities in shipboard systems.
While there is appropriate concern being given to traditional great power
adversaries—e.g., China, Russia, and Iran—tactical and strategic sabotage
on information and information-dependent systems are becoming so commonplace and inexpensive that smaller nation-state adversaries and organized groups can take advantage of this deficiency by acting on their own
or as proxies for great powers. Coupled with the relative ease with which
information can be weaponized with fairly insecure maritime systems, and
we see a formula for a new form of IW. This form of IW is exacerbated when
we look at the littoral, or nearshore zone (LZ) of the world, since the biggest
physical threats to ships are in the relatively shallow waters of the coast and
inland waters.

Overview
This report will explore and identify maritime cyber threats that promote or
enable IW vectors that can negatively impact naval activities within the scope
1
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of USSOCOM. Moreover, this monograph integrates both the maritime and
the cyber domains of warfare. While the intersection of the maritime environment and the cyber realm is not explicitly defined, the U.S. Department
of Defense (DOD) describes operations in cyberspace as follows:
Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, the
global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures
and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
Developments in cyberspace provide the means for the U.S. military,
its allies, and partner nations to gain and maintain a strategic, continuing advantage in the operational environment (OE).3

There are many ways in which sub-state actors, jihadists, and other terrorist organizations are waging a guerrilla war on the sea via cyberspace.4
Increasingly sophisticated and damaging cyberattacks are becoming more
commonplace everywhere. Furthermore, attacks in cyberspace are now relatively easy and inexpensive, including the jamming and spoofing of navigation messages to cause confusion or misdirection in and around ports.5 If
an adversary cannot manage a cyberattack on its own, it can ally with likeminded hacking groups—or, hire such a capability from those who advertise “hacking as a service.” Hacking groups from China—such as APT10
and TEMP.Periscope—have targeted the maritime industry, U.S. Defense
Industrial Base (DIB), and U.S. military assets abroad.6 As noted in a 2019
audit by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, both commercial and government maritime systems have become increasing susceptible to cyberattacks.7
It has manifested as a global grey zone conflict, where proxies and cyber
mercenaries use non-kinetic means to intimidate adversaries, steal precious
defense technology, and compromise data and control systems. Thus, the
most dangerous part of a sea voyage is often not in the deep ocean, but in
the shallow waters of the LZ—including inland waters and ports—where
malign actors can infiltrate a ship’s integrated technological systems. Causing
a ship to veer from a precise course by even a few tens of meters can cause
significant damage to vessels, ground assets, and/or delay vessel and cargo
transport. Small errors in tight waterways ripple quickly and can rapidly lead
to progressively more damaging second-, third-, and fourth-order effects.
2
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Characteristics of the LZ
The LZ refers to near coastal waters—the area of the ocean most affected by
tides and currents, shallow waters, and vagaries of a coastline. This is the part
of the ocean where local mariners would have the most intimate knowledge,
a distinct advantage over transient sailors and guests. In hostile regions
around the globe, the zone is often most traversed by seafarers without the
means or reach of deep-sea watercraft. Water conditions change several times
a day, as well as seasonally; small errors in navigation can cause disastrous
results, being the difference between open water and running up on rocks.8
This section will describe the characteristics of the LZ and considerations
related to IW.9 For this discussion, we will use the DOD definition for littoral:
The littoral comprises two segments of operational environment:
1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must
be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area
inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly
from the sea.10

The LZ, then, is the area where tides and currents are a significant factor
on both water movement that affects ships and erosion that affects a changing seabed and shoreline. This is the area where the power and energy of
the ocean is most acutely felt.11 While the water is often the focus of the
LZ, much of the understanding of the near coastal sea is dependent upon
understanding the shoreline and the interactions between the near coastal
landscape and the water.12 See Appendix A for a more detailed description.
More significantly, the LZ has grown in its political, logistic, demographic, and economic importance over the past three decades. After the
fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar world order, tensions between states seeking regional hegemony—such as Iran and Saudi
Arabia—have proliferated. The threat is most critical in strategic maritime
chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz—where up to 21 million barrels of
crude pass each day13—or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which lies at the intersection of the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Similarly, the
vast majority of the world’s capital cities and population centers are in the
littorals, underscoring their logistic and economic enormity.14
Because the LZ is where the sea and the land meet, straits and ports are in
this zone and represent chokepoints for both merchant and military vessels.
3
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Nearly 40 percent of the world’s population lives within 60 miles (100 kilometers) of the coast, and almost three-quarters live within 200 miles (320 kilometers) of the coast. It is also noteworthy that nearly 600 million people live
in coastal areas at an elevation of less than 33 feet (10 meters) above sea level.
Indeed, sea level rise presents a tactical issue as
Nearly 40 percent of
it impacts coastal erosion, storm surges, and
the world’s population
tidal water encroachment into estuaries and
lives within 60 miles
near-coast river systems. Climate change has a
(100 kilometers) of the
disproportionate impact on the LZ compared
coast, and almost threewith inland communities.15
quarters live within 200
Operating a vessel in the LZ requires a
miles (320 kilometers)
different skill set than operating on the open
of the coast.
ocean. For instance, pilots are needed in complex harbors and inlets because of the requirement of local knowledge for safe passage. Navigability of near-coastal waters
depends on tides (and whether they are diurnal vs. semi-diurnal16), currents,
and weather. Shoaling within a channel or river can quickly change the
nature of the passage. Pilots need accurate charts to indicate the bottom
composition, hazards to navigation, and other landmarks to aid positioning.
Small, unanticipated changes in geographic position can be fatal to a vessel;
accurate knowledge of location is important. Understanding the tidal effects
on vessels, in terms of both water depth and current, are imperative. A small
tidal change of just a few feet (1 meter) can cause ripping currents in some
areas, while tidal bores of 5–30 feet (1.5–9 meters) occur in other regions;
extreme tidal ranges of more than 50 feet (15 meters) are seen in the Bay of
Fundy and Leaf Basin in Ungava Bay, Canada.17
The LZ is such a unique place in terms of military operations that the
U.S. Navy designated a new class of surface warfare vessel in 2002 known as
littoral combat ships (LCS). Because they are designed specifically to operate
in the LZ, they take advantage of the fact that many traditional shipboard
functions such as training, some maintenance, and logistics, can actually
be performed on shore—thus reducing crew size and allowing for ships to
be specifically designed to the nearshore task.18 These specialized craft can
be more rapidly constructed at a lower cost than traditional Navy warships,
meaning that more can be produced in order to focus on the asymmetric
threats of IW in this zone.19
4
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SOF in the LZ
Historically, SOF has been extremely active in the LZ. Operations inside
the littorals include raids; ambushes; combat swimmer attacks; sabotage;
abductions; reconnaissance; harbor penetration; visit, board, search and
seizure; and extractions. Yet, as the U.S. military postures itself for an era
of great power competition, some have questioned the utility of the LCS.20
Meanwhile, the 21st century has seen the near coastal waters become the
most active setting for discord in the maritime domain. Instead of major sea
battles between large ships, the fight is in the domain of “irregular” adversaries, especially as smaller forces act as proxies for larger nation-states and
near-peer competitors.21 Engagements with irregular forces and non-state
combat at low intensities has shown an upward trend, thereby creating the
need for SOF to become increasingly prepared to engage and preempt the
tactics of adversaries in the LZ.22

Cybersecurity in the LZ
Although relatively well understood at a strategic level, little has been discussed about the cybersecurity impacts on warfare in the LZ.23 Like so many
other aspects of applications of technology, cybersecurity implications are
often an afterthought rather than considered during design and planning.
Indeed, ship design and planning evolves at a much slower rate than changes
in the cybersecurity threat landscape, making it difficult for ship infrastructure to keep up with cyber in the best of circumstances. Cybersecurity in
the maritime domain has only become a focus area in the last decade and
impacts many aspects of the operation of the entire Maritime Transportation System (MTS). The remainder of this document will specifically address
several aspects of maritime cybersecurity as it impacts vessels in the LZ and
cyberattacks that might be employed by irregular adversaries.24 Much of the
discussion will cover implications for civilian vessels but might be equally
applicable to—or could have an impact upon—military vessels. The nature
of the LZ is such that civilian vessels will always be a factor because of their
presence, relative ease of exploitation, and potential to become a threat to
SOF operation. In addition, irregular adversaries might view civilian vessels
as a target for hostile activity, cover for hostile activity, or as a weapon to use
against traditional military forces.25
5
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Key Takeaways
This monograph presents three key takeaways:
1. Competitive Advantage. USSOCOM’s agility, global presence, and
combat-focused mission requires forward thinking preparation and
planning. As a combatant command that is joint by nature, USSOCOM
is uniquely postured to maintain the competitive advantage in crossdomain operations, such as maritime cyber.
2. Maritime IW. The maritime domain enables U.S. global reach and
global power. While great power competitors and near-peer adversaries are growing their conventional forces, they are also pushing
back against U.S. interests though proxies and gray-zone activities,
especially in the maritime domain. SOF support of U.S. Navy IW is
central towards limiting the maneuver capability of hostile forces.
3. Technology Vulnerabilities. While advances in the integration of
maritime, satellite, and cyber technologies have greatly enabled the
U.S. armed forces, nefarious activities such as hacking and spoofing
are on the rise, enterprise-level maritime systems are vulnerable, and
malign actors have been able to penetrate various points in the global
supply chain. It is incumbent upon the SOF community to recognize
these challenges, develop plans to test the resiliency of the force, and
counter hostile actors when necessary.

Organization of This Monograph
This monograph addresses how threats in cyberspace can negatively impact
maritime U.S. SOF operations in littoral waters. The objective of this report
is to identify relevant maritime cyber vulnerabilities that can be exploited
and turned into viable threats against U.S. SOF. The relative risks of these
vulnerabilities are also assessed and ranked to provide a strategy of how to
mitigate, combat, or otherwise manage the dangers; thereby supporting the
U.S. Navy’s intent of maintaining maritime superiority.
This section has provided an overview of the characteristics of the LZ
and the relationship of that region to IW. Subsequent sections describe the
most salient cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the maritime domain and their
impact on warfare in the LZ. Chapter 1 reviews global navigation satellite
6
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systems (GNSS) and the implications of electronic attacks on positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT). Chapter 2 examines the automatic identification system (AIS) and vulnerabilities that can lead to numerous attacks
affecting vessel situational awareness. Chapter 3 discusses how viruses,
worms, and other malware can impact maritime systems, and how SOF
can organize to be more resilient against vulnerabilities in the defense supply
chain. Chapter 4 introduces how cyber vulnerabilities in industrial control
systems (ICS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices can lead to problems
aboard ships and at ports. Chapter 5 discusses autonomous vessels and the
ramifications of cyber vulnerabilities. The final chapter presents conclusions
and the implications of maritime cyber issues for SOF, and the role of SOF
in defense of U.S. Navy assets. The appendices provide technical background
detail to the topics above so that the interested reader can further extrapolate
their impact on IW.

7
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Chapter 1. Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS)
A poor grasp of dead reckoning may have led Christopher Columbus
to North America instead of India, a navigational error of about
8,000 miles. - Eric Schlosser26

H

umans have been navigating on the high seas for several thousand
years. Early mariners used the weather, nature of the seas, position
of stars, and presence or absence of certain bird and fish species to navigate
from one place to another.27 The astrolabe, likely developed as early as the
second century to determine latitude, was not routinely used until the 1400s
by European explorers.28 The first circumnavigation of the globe using charts
and instruments was reportedly accomplished by Magellan around 1520.
Accurate marine chronometers with which to determine longitude were
not available until the late 1700s.29 Maritime navigation aided by radio was
developed in the early 1900s, followed by radar navigation in the mid-1900s,
and satellite navigation in the late 1900s.30
GNSS refers to the myriad systems employing this latest generation of
navigational aid. GNSS can also refer to the software applications that work
with the Global Positioning System (GPS), such as target acquisition, missile
guidance, search and rescue (SAR), coordinate bombing, precision survey,
instrument approach, range instrumentation, close air support, surveillance,
and reconnaissance. Although professional mariners rely on much more
than just electronic aids for navigation and plotting, there is still considerable reliance on technical solutions and many still trust the electronics more
than their own senses when the two are in conflict. This section will discuss
some background of GNSS and GPS, and potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can cause particular hazards in the LZ. Technical details about
the operation of GNSS and GPS systems can be found in Appendix 2.

SOF and GNSS
Attacks on GNSS might generally be considered as falling more under the
category of electronic warfare (EW) rather than cyberwarfare. The DOD
9
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recognizes that many cyberspace operations include traditional computerand network-based attacks on data, as well as significant portions of EW
and other mission areas.31 Indeed, software-defined radio (SDR) for wireless
networks and other emerging technologies are blurring the line between the
common understanding of cyberattacks and EW, and these two missions
are falling closer into alignment.32
Rather than employ the term secure GPS, DOD instead uses the term
PNT, thereby both encapsulating the vulnerabilities of GNSS and the expectations of the users.33 DOD has even defined the term navigation warfare
to refer to defensive and offensive operations that affect PNT capabilities.34
Meanwhile, GNSS applications are of particular relevance to the SOF community. GNSS technologies such as anti-jam GPS, anti-spoofing software,
and EW systems allow SOF to operate in denied areas.35 USSOCOM reported
that “2017 and 2018 saw unprecedented GNSS interference activity, from
the eastern Mediterranean to Norway and
GNSS interference, and
Finland.”36 GNSS interference, and particuparticularly GPS spoofing,
larly GPS spoofing, which causes the receiver
which causes the receiver
to give false information, can mean the difto give false information,
ference between life and death in military
can mean the difference
contexts. These technologies have become
between life and death in
more affordable and widely available, putmilitary contexts.
ting the SOF community in unprecedented
danger.

GNSS Overview
GNSS is a generic term that refers to the four global satellite navigation
systems: China’s BeiDou; Galileo, created by the European Union (EU);
Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS);37 and the U.S. GPS—
plus the two regional systems: India’s Navigation with Indian Constellation
(NAVIC)38 and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.39 Each of these systems
are independent of one another, but work in a similar fashion. For purposes
of this report, GPS will be the primary focus.40
Originally named NAVSTAR, GPS began as a joint project of the U.S. Air
Force and U.S. Navy in the late 1960s and is generally considered to be the
first GNSS. The GPS system and satellite constellation are currently managed
by the U.S. Space Force.41 GPS transmits messages on three frequencies in
10
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the L band (1–2 GHz), denoted L1, L2, and L5.42 Each message contains such
information as the current date and time, exact position of the transmitting
satellite, and an approximate position of every satellite in the constellation.
A GPS receiver can determine its exact geographic position by acquiring the
signal from four satellites; the fourth satellite is essential for the recovery of
the clock, which can reduce positioning error to just a few feet (1 meter).43
GPS satellites transmit their navigation messages in both encrypted and
unencrypted form. The unencrypted messages are freely available to the
public for civilian use and standard precision applications. The encrypted
messages are intended for military and other official applications, making
the signals more robust and resistant to spoofing than civilian GPS.44
GNSS Security Vulnerabilities and Mitigations
GNSS technologies have been under development since before the 1970s.
With the exception of the use of encrypted codes for military applications,
security was not one of the design criteria. Although GPS and other GNSS
are undergoing constant upgrades and improvements in their technology,
protocols, clocks, and extended satellite lifetimes—a process often referred
to as GNSS Modernization—the systems remain vulnerable to several types
of deliberate attacks that modernization does not address; of particular relevance to maritime operations in the LZ are jamming, spoofing, and timing
signal attacks.45
Jamming
GNSS jamming refers to any device or method intended to interfere with
the GNSS satellite signals. Jammers work by distorting or otherwise overpowering the signal so that the receiver cannot obtain its navigational fix.
Since the GNSS signal reaches the surface at an extremely low power level, a
small transmitter in the same frequency range can overpower the legitimate
GNSS signals. Jammers are inexpensive and easy to purchase or build; a
jammer for “personal use” the size of a hand-held radio can cause localized
jamming within a 165 foot (50 meter) radius for a cost of about $15046 and a
more sophisticated jammer to cause a more widespread outage is well within
the financial reach of an adversarial force.47
Jamming can be very effectively used by one military force against
another, because different GNSS constellations use different frequencies
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(table 1). Thus, if two opposing forces are using different GNSS systems, one
can safely jam the signals of the other without impacting their own signals.48
Table 1. L band frequencies used by GNSS with global coverage. Source: Lavrov,
Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation
BeiDou

Galileo

1561.098 MHz (B1)
1207.140 MHz (B2)
1268.520 MHz (B3)

1575.42 MHz (E1)
1176.45 MHz (E5a)
1207.14 MHz (E5b)
1278.75 MHz (E6)

GLONASS
1602.0 MHz (L1)
1246.0 MHz (L2)
1202.0 MHz (L3)

GPS
1575.42 MHz (L1)
1227.60 MHz (L2)
1176.45 MHz (L5)

Another technology that allows easy access to advanced jamming is SDR.
SDR uses a hardware transmitter that plugs into a computer’s Universal
Serial Bus (USB) port, an external antenna, and freely available, open-source
software in order to transmit any desired signal on any frequency the transmitter/antenna are capable of, including those in the ultra high frequency
(UHF) L-band. Use of SDR transmitters are within the technological reach
of almost anyone, and there are even YouTube videos providing tutorials for
building such devices.49
It is relatively straight-forward for GNSS receivers to detect efforts at
jamming; analysis of the frequency power spectrum or measuring the signalto-noise ratio can indicate interference.50 Many GPS receivers, in fact, have
built-in jamming—and spoofing—detection. Low-cost jamming detection
can even be built using SDR, the same inexpensive “do it yourself” technology that can be employed to build a low-cost jammer.51
While GNSS jamming is possible to detect and track—even from space52—
there are very few good defenses against deliberate jamming of GNSS signals.
If a jamming signal is primarily interfering from a single direction, an antijamming antenna can be used to alter the gain to essentially ignore the jamming signal and rely on other legitimate signals. If several jammers can target
a receiver from multiple directions, the only defense might be to employ
a different GNSS constellation. The lesson here is that any allied military
operation would be well served to use receivers that employ at least Galileo
and GPS; utilization of multiple constellations provides both redundancy
in case one system fails and the capability to ensure positional integrity by
cross-checking between different systems.53
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Spoofing
GNSS spoofing, as opposed to jamming, refers to actions that cause a receiver
to lock on to a bogus signal and miscalculate its position. Unlike jamming,
where a false signal merely needs to overwhelm a legitimate one, a spoofed
transmission needs to have the same structure and timing as a legitimate
GNSS navigation message, but changed in such a way that the receiver miscalculates its location.54 Because of the use of encrypted ranging codes, military GNSS units are largely immune to spoofing unless the decryption keys
are compromised;55 they are not immune, however, to jamming.
GNSS spoofing is always a deliberate act; it is complex and requires
specialized equipment that can disrupt a legitimate signal in order that
the victim computes a false position fix and/or a false clock offset.56 Most
spoofing methods require that the bogus transmitter overwhelm the satellite signals being received by a GNSS device and
GNSS spoofing is
therein lies one of the ways in which spoofing
always a deliberate
can be detected. First, when the GNSS receiver
act; it is complex and
locks on to the bogus signal, there is a distortion
requires specialized
as it loses the legitimate signal, resulting in a blip
equipment that can
that is visible on the GNSS display; there is no
disrupt a legitimate
such distortion when there is a handoff between
signal in order that
legitimate satellites (or if the spoofing device
the victim computes
slowly increases its power so as to appear like a
a false position fix
normal handoff). This anomaly can be seen in
and/or a false clock
figure 1. In this example, after successful spoofing
offset.
the GPS signal, attackers prompt the helmsman

to steer the vessel off its original course (upper
graph). The individual codes emitted by a half-dozen GPS satellites disappear
at about the 400-second mark, as the spoofer captures the ship’s receivers
(middle graph). Second, a spoofing detector based on monitoring the signal’s
direction-of-arrival could warn the crew when it senses too little variance
in the origins of the signals, as seen here at the 400-second mark (lower
graph).57 Legitimate GNSS signals will come from at least four different satellites which are in four different directions (and distances) relative to the
receiver whereas a spoofer can, presumably, only be in one place at one time
so all signals will appear to come from the same direction and have the same
relative power when received.58
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Figure 1. Anomalies appear during a GPS spoofing attack.
Source: Todd Humphreys/used with permission
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There are several detection methods or workarounds to GNSS spoofing. Two methods are mentioned above: signal distortion detection, and
direction-of-signal detection. A third method correlates the encrypted code
on the L1 channel with the unencrypted code to ensure authenticity—even
though a civilian GPS receiver cannot read the encrypted code information.59
Another defense for civilian GNSS units, as with jamming, is to employ
receivers that can employ multiple constellations; when spoofing is detected,
the receiver can change to another constellation.60
One reason civilian receivers are more vulnerable to spoofing is only
partially related to the use of encrypted codes; military devices are also hardened because the encrypted code acts as a mechanism to authenticate the
transmitter. If a civilian GPS unit receives properly formatted unencrypted
signals, the device has no way to know if those signals are legitimate or
spoofed. While many of these types of attacks are unlikely from “irregular”
warriors, they are well within the capabilities of a nation-state that sponsors
irregulars as proxies.

Other GNSS Vulnerabilities
A third major form of attack on GNSS systems is to disrupt the timing signal.
GNSS-derived timing affects more than GNSS receivers. Many systems
rely on GNSS to obtain their time; all digital telecommunications systems,
including the North American mobile phone network and digital telecommunications carriers, must be synchronized to operate properly. Power grids
and some Network Time Protocol servers on the internet also derive timing
from GPS. Any system relying on GPS positioning—such as Enhanced 911
(emergency) triangulation, or aviation and maritime transportation systems—requires precise timing.61 Timing disruptions do not need to be large
to have big effects; a 1 nanosecond (10-9 second) error in timing can cause a
1 foot (30 centimeter) positioning error.62 Again, this form of disruption is
beyond the means of irregular warriors but not their nation-state sponsors.
A variety of mitigations have been suggested to deal with timing attacks,
all essentially providing backup or augmentation to a device’s dependence
upon GNSS for synchronization. One approach is to employ inertial navigation systems and inertial measurement units (IMU). IMUs use a combination of sensors, accelerometers, and gyroscopes to independently measure
movement without use of an external reference, essentially employing a
15
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highly advanced form of dead reckoning.63 Other approaches include proposals to build alternate timing systems to provide an external reference for
GPS.64 Finally, radio signals do not need to be manipulated to send bogus
GNSS information if an adversary can gain physical access to a vessel. Such
physical access to a military vessel is unlikely but manipulating civilian or
autonomous vessels in the LZ can also serve an adversary’s purpose.
Messages can be sent between onboard devices requiring GNSS data via
a variety of communications interfaces, such as the serial port (e.g., EIA-RS232), USB, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, SDR, and UHF radio.65 If bogus GNSS messages
can be introduced into the system from one compromised device, the result
can be false GNSS displays, operational errors, or, at the very least, confusion
as to accurate position.66

GPS Disruption Case Studies and Implications
Jamming and spoofing of GNSS signals have grown so significantly since
2010 that it has become a strategic weapon of conflict.67 It is certainly a
major threat to commercial shipping and that can very well translate to
a warzone which, by its nature, is intermixed with commercial and other
civilian vessels.68
Instances of GNSS jamming have become commonplace in the news.
Although illegal in the U.S. and many other countries, GNSS jammers are
routinely used by many people under the guise of protecting their privacy.
In one case, a man in New Jersey used a GPS jammer so that his employer
would not know where he was during his breaks. His route took him near
Newark Liberty Airport, and he inadvertently jammed the airport’s GPS
system during trials of its automatic aircraft landing systems.69 While his
intent was personal privacy, a nefarious user or an adversary could certainly
use these same devices at any time. And, as mentioned above, jammers are
relatively simple to build and easy to acquire.70 In many ways, jamming is
the most significant problem facing GNSS since it has a low cost of entry,
employs off-the-shelf technology, and can impact both civilian and military
receivers.71
The first widely publicized civilian GPS spoofing demonstration of capability occurred in 2013. In this incident, a team from The University of Texas
at Austin (UT) spoofed GPS signals in the Mediterranean Sea, causing White
Rose Of Drachs, a 213 foot (65 meter) yacht, to alter its course and heading.72
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So much has been written about this event that any malicious actor could use
it as a blueprint for how to carry out such an attack. The team used commercial, off-the-shelf products rather than sophisticated specialized equipment,
making it particularly relevant to an irregular adversary.
The first step in the spoofing operation was for the UT team to determine
which GPS satellites would be visible to the target at a given time. Using
publicly available databases, the team fabricated the unencrypted codes on
the L1 band for each visible satellite. At that point, the spoofing device started
to broadcast very low-power signals carrying the legitimate codes of all the
visible satellites. The spoofer slowly increased the power of the bogus signal
until, eventually, the receiver latched onto the new signal and lost the legitimate signals. By increasing the false signal strength slowly, the likelihood
decreases of the receiver or the ship’s crew detecting a blip. Once the GPS
receiver is listening to the bogus signals, the spoofing device can send a new
set of position coordinates. In this case, the UT team sent signals that made
it appear that the vessel had drifted three degrees to the left, a shift so slight
that the crew assumed it was due to natural winds and currents. The crew
then compensated for this by shifting the vessel slightly to the right which,
in fact, took them off course. The test was terminated after White Rose Of
Drachs was brought about 3,300 feet (1 kilometer) off course. While the crew
had a priori knowledge that an attack would take place, they had no specific
knowledge about how the test would be conducted nor did they knowingly
cooperate with the attack team. Furthermore, a navigation system would
have responded the same as the crew—albeit more quickly—so this same
spoofing attack would have worked against a vessel using an autopilot.73
The UT demonstration of capability became an alarming reality in 2017
when a mass GPS spoofing event occurred in the Black Sea. On 22 June 2017,
the master of the 37,500 ton tanker Atria, off the Russian port of Novorossiysk, reported that his GPS showed Atria to be at Gelendzhik Airport—20
nautical miles (37 kilometer) away (figure 2). Navigation systems from at
least 20 nearby ships showed them all to be at the same location, so closest
point of approach (CPA) alarms on many vessels were indicating imminent
collisions.74
At the time of the Black Sea incident, there was widespread speculation
that it was due to Russian EW. According to a 2019 report from the Center
for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), the Black Sea event was, in fact, part
of a larger pattern of Russian GNSS interference. By analyzing satellite data
17
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Figure 2. A GPS display on board the Atria during a spoofing event shows reported
versus actual position. Source: Captain Gurvan Le Meur/used with permission

gathered by the International Space Station (ISS), C4ADS concluded that
Russia has been manipulating civilian GNSS signals since at least 2016. The
ISS data show nearly 9,900 suspected spoofing incidents associated with the
Russian military at ten global locations, including the Black Sea, Crimea, the
Russian Federation, and Syria. The data also show more than 1,300 civilian
vessels fed incorrect positional coordinates from a range of civilian satellite
networks, including the 2017 incident reported by Atria.75
Since 2018, there have been many reports of GNSS issues in the Eastern
Mediterranean, including signal interference, reduced position accuracy,
and loss of signal.76 The affected areas ranged from Cyprus and the coast of
Egypt to Israel and Saudi Arabia, resulting in multiple maritime advisories
from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Maritime Administration.77 GNSS outages continue to be a common occurrence all over the world
impacting merchant shipping and other mariners.78 GPS spoofing incidents
in Russian waters are also continuing, and have placed ships at multiple
airports—including Sochi, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok.79
18

Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions

Figure 3. The reported track is shown of Stena Impero just prior to its seizure by
the Iranian Navy. Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence/used with permission

In July 2019, an escalation in the weaponization of GNSS spoofing reportedly occurred in the Strait of Hormuz. Stena Impero, a United Kingdom
(UK)-flagged oil tanker, was seized by Iran ostensibly for violating international law. One claim was that it collided with a fishing boat, and another
was that it was in the wrong channel when exiting the Strait. Regardless of
the stated reason, reports had already come out that Iran was using GNSS
spoofing, and a satellite track of the vessel shows it making a normal pass
through the Strait before taking a sudden veer towards Iranian territorial
waters (figure 3). Despite their claims of territorial violations, it is widely
believed that Iran seized the vessel as retaliation for the British impounding an Iranian-controlled oil tanker earlier in the month in Gibraltar for
violating EU sanctions.80
A new escalation in GNSS spoofing was found after a reported incident
in the Port of Shanghai in 2019. In mid-July, Manukai, a 700 foot (213 meter)
container ship, was making way towards her assigned berth. While in the
Huangpu River, the master of the vessel reported that the navigation system
displayed another ship moving in the same channel. Then, the other ship
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suddenly disappeared from the navigation screen. After a minute or two, the
other ship reappeared, now at the dock. Later, the pattern repeated with the
other ship appearing on the display moving in the channel, disappearing,
and then reappearing back at the dock. Using binoculars, the master was
able to locate the other vessel and confirm that it had never left the dock. As
Manukai reached its own berth, its GPS receivers and all navigation systems
suddenly failed, and the captain was unable to get a fix.81

Figure 4. GPS circle spoofing is shown in the area of the Huangpu River near
the Port of Shanghai. Source: C4ADS/used with permission

This incident turned out to be just the tip of iceberg. Further analysis of
AIS data by C4ADS showed that similar GPS spoofing had been occurring
in the area since the summer of 2018—increasing in intensity and number
of spoofing incidents over time, hitting a peak of nearly 300 spoofing events
on the day that Manukai was affected. This event was a major escalation
from the previously reported Russian spoofing where all targeted vessels
showed up together at a single point; spoofed ships in Shanghai, China were
found to jump around every few minutes to different locations that seemed
20
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to concentrate in large circles, primarily on the east bank of the Huangpu
(figure 4). Huangpu Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) vessels were
among those targeted, where the data show almost daily spoofing attacks;
one MSA boat was shown to have been spoofed 394 times in a nine month
period.82 This so-called circle spoofing has also been reported in Iran and in
other locations around the world, where vessels have found their equipment
reporting their location thousands of miles from their actual position.83 By
all appearances, GPS spoofing is a part of an escalating maritime electronic
war in the area of Shanghai; more on this in the section about AIS spoofing
below.

Concluding Observations
This section has described the operation of GNSS, with a particular focus on
GPS. Like so many of our technology systems, they are surprisingly fragile
and subject to malign intent. The importance of GPS to the nation’s critical
infrastructures is so acute that an executive order (EO) was issued in early
2020 to identify all ways in which GPS affects our nation’s infrastructures
and add resiliency to the system.84 In addition, the USCG—responding to
the request of more than a dozen maritime organizations—filed a formal
protest with the United Nations over the threat to safe navigation posed by
GNSS disruptions.85
For the SOF community, GNSS is essential for everyday operations. GNSS
provides the warfighter with enhanced situational awareness, terrain awareness, the projection of radio frequency countermeasures, and the ability to
operate in denied environments. The GNSS-enabled warfighter is autonomous and—when it comes to understanding location, even in those hostile
and foreign—largely self-sufficient. Without GNSS, the warfighter becomes
more isolated; some communications become increasingly difficult. This
kind of disruption can easily paralyze the warfighter on today’s technologyenabled battlefield. Yet, while GNSS gives warriors a remarkable advantage,
overreliance on the technology has become an exploitable liability in ways
that are not even yet fully understood.86 To overcome this potential handicap,
the U.S. Government has wisely “begun to place more emphasis on training
warfighters in more traditional skills; reading paper maps, navigating by the
stars with the help of sextants, and the use of physical map boards to monitor
troop locations on the ground.”87 This is absolutely necessary to counter the
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traditional assumption that these technological systems are always accurate and operate without interference. Going forward, it will be important
to train tomorrow’s warfighter to not only understand the technology, but
to understand the assumptions behind the technological output. This will
enable the warfighter to ask the right questions, challenge assumptions, and
operate seamlessly in both an analog and a technological battlefield.
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Chapter 2. Automatic Identification
System (AIS)
There are no rogue ships; there are only rogue shipowners. - Barista Uno88

T

he AIS is a situational awareness system whereby vessels and shore stations within a 10–20 nautical mile range can exchange tracking information. With this system, vessels at sea are aware of each other’s presence;
maritime authorities in littoral states can identify and monitor vessels and
cargo in their area of responsibility; and navigation, meteorological, safety,
and other items of information can be exchanged between ships and shore
stations—including ports. AIS is critically important in the LZ. These waters
have the most congestion in terms of the number of vessels; the most hazards
to navigation, given the relatively shallow waters of the near coastal zone;
and the most danger from IW. A large number of adversaries could operate
easily and freely in this part of the ocean.89 This section provides an overview
of AIS, the cyber vulnerabilities of the system, and the implications of these
vulnerabilities. Technical details about the operation of AIS can be found
in Appendix 3.

SOF and AIS
Most of the technology required to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness is
heavily dependent on AIS technology. For many years, U.S. Navy vessels have
used AIS in receive-only mode as standard practice to preserve operational
security.90 After a series of ship collisions in the Pacific Ocean, this policy
came under review.91 Commercial vessels operating in international waters
typically operate with an active AIS, but often conceal their movements to
circumnavigate criminally active waters.92
AIS can serve as a warning to those conducting counter-piracy operations. Historically, hijackers of commercial vessels have been unfamiliar
with the operation of a ship’s AIS. This can serve as a warning to those conducting counter-piracy operations; if a commercial ship is not transmitting
its AIS signals, or will not send their AIS beacon upon request, it is often
a sign of piracy. However, a new trendline in the industry is revealing that
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many tech-savvy pirates and proxies have become intimately familiar with
shipboard AIS and are fully capable of spoofing the transmissions.93
While military vessels may have secure AIS, military ships are not
immune to the hazards of AIS vulnerabilities. A malign actor can target a
civilian vessel to force a harmful interaction with a military vessel, particularly if the military vessel is invisible to both AIS—due to not transmitting
AIS information—and radar, due to naval stealth technology. Likewise, a
small irregular force can employ multiple AIS spoofing scenarios in order
to masquerade as a larger force; direct commercial or military traffic into
undefended or indefensible waters; or coax movement away from a safe port.
In addition, a military vessel can alter its own signal to portray a slightly
different location, with the intention of negatively impacting the defenses
of adversaries.

AIS Security Vulnerabilities
Although AIS was designed in the 1990s, security was not built in to AIS
standards until the current OneNet standard—which was released in 2020—
appears in products, projected for 2021.94 Balduzzi et al.,95 Goudossis and
Katsikas,96 and Kessler et al.,97 among others, have discussed security vulnerabilities in AIS that identify a variety of attacks on the system.
Balduzzi et al.98 have identified myriad attacks on AIS based on four
primary protocol weaknesses:
1. Lack of validity checks. AIS messages contain no geographic validation information, meaning that it is possible for a bad actor to send
an AIS message from one location while purporting to be in another
location.
2. Lack of timing checks. AIS messages do not natively contain a timestamp, meaning that a bad actor can record valid AIS messages and
replay them at a later time.
3. Lack of authentication. The AIS protocol provides no mechanism to
authenticate the sender, thus anyone with the ability to transmit an
AIS packet can impersonate any other AIS device.
4. Lack of integrity checks. AIS messages contain no message integrity
checks, allowing an adversary to intercept and/or modify transmissions.
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Because AIS operates on public maritime radio frequencies, anyone with
an AIS receiver can hear all the transmissions. While AIS transceivers were
relatively expensive at one time, there are many ways today to build inexpensive systems—on the order of $100—to both receive and transmit AIS
messages.99 AIS users also share the broadcast frequency. While efficient
in terms of communications resources, this allows an attacker to usurp
the bandwidth to deny other devices the opportunity to transmit, impede
the shared time slot synchronization process, or change slot reservation/
assignment information. Any of these denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can
effectively knock other AIS stations off the air or, indeed, render the entire
system useless within a geographically localized area.

AIS Spoofing Case Studies and Implications
AIS employs publicly available message formats, transmits on public maritime radio frequencies, and is designed to assume that all transmissions are
legitimate and valid. This allows a bad actor
AIS employs publicly
to transmit messages of their own creation,
available message formats,
to spoof non-existent ghost vessels or aid to
transmits on public marinavigation (ATON), replay earlier AIS traftime radio frequencies,
fic, trigger false SAR or CPA alerts, or send
and is designed to assume
bogus weather or navigation information—
that all transmissions are
possibly causing a vessel to alter its course.
legitimate and valid.
Data about an existing vessel can even be

altered in real time. An AIS DoS attack can
cause a local AIS broadcast area to go dark. These attacks are enabled by
software tools, commonly available on the internet, that can generate AIS
messages.100
Figure 5 is a demonstration of the display of ghost vessels. The figure
shows symbols for nine vessels in the Daytona Beach, Florida, area, displayed using OpenCPN101 chartplotter software. Details for each vessel can
be found merely by clicking on the target. Chasity Brooke is a real vessel, as
are six of the other targets shown here. Sea Fox and one other target are also
real vessels but had been in the area six months earlier; their data are being
replayed and interjected into the AIS data stream. A bogus vessel could also
be injected into the system. It is impossible to tell from AIS alone which ships
are real and which are ghosts.102
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Figure 5. AIS display of real (Chasity Brooke) and ghost (Sea Fox) vessels off the
coast of Daytona Beach, Florida. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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Figure 6. An AIS display of real and fake virtual ATONs is shown in Ponce De
Leon Inlet, south of Daytona Beach, Florida. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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Figure 6 is a demonstration of ghost ATONs. The figure shows the physical red and green ATON buoys in Ponce de Leon Inlet on the east coast of
Florida, marking the portion of the inlet that is dredged to a depth of at least
30 feet (9 meters). The figure also shows a set of virtual ATONs that include
a preferred channel marker, labelled “PI,” and virtual red/green ATONs
defining a second channel on the south side, which is significantly shallower.
These virtual ATONs appear on the display based upon spoofed AIS messages. The USCG has sole authority in the U.S. for transmitting information
about virtual ATONs, but there is no mechanism with which to authenticate
the sender of this information.103

Concluding Observations
AIS spoofing is any event where AIS-related displays show bogus information. The earlier discussion of GPS spoofing related to Stena Impero off the
coast of Iran and the Port of Shanghai were reported as AIS spoofing. The
root cause in both cases, however, were spoofed GPS signals, which caused
the AIS equipment to display incorrect information rather than spoofed
AIS messages. That said, AIS spoofing is also a part of the larger Port of
Shanghai story. Smugglers in the area, primarily carrying valuable cargos
of banned sand and gravel, have been spoofing AIS signals—pretending
to be other vessels—to escape detection by the authorities. The Shanghai
MSA reports that illegal sand and gravel vessels accounted for 23 collisions,
meaning two moving vessels striking each other—or allisions, meaning a
vessel striking a stationary object—on the Yangtze River in 2018 at a cost of
53 lives. The AIS spoofing threat shows no sign of stopping; in June 2019, an
oil tanker suspected of smuggling oil had been sending cloned AIS signals
and reportedly rammed an MSA patrol boat to evade capture.104 Reports in
2020 described AIS data showing several boats traveling in circles around
the area of Point Reyes, just north of San Francisco, California, although
their true positions were confirmed to be in different locations thousands
of miles away.105 Countering AIS jamming and spoofing will be a particular
concern for SOF in the future.
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Chapter 3. Malware And Maritime Systems
We worried for decades about WMDs—Weapons of Mass Destruction. Now it is time to worry about a new kind of WMDs—Weapons
of Mass Disruption. - John Mariotti106

M

alicious software—also known as malware—is a threat to all computer systems and the information they contain. This chapter will
discuss malware as it applies to the maritime sector. A tutorial providing
details on the different types of malware affecting the maritime industry is
provided in appendix 4.

SOF and Malware
The SOF maritime systems are far from immune to the effects of malware.
Indeed, military cyber targets are of strategic importance in the theater of littoral waters. Cyberattacks today happen at a time when the attacker chooses.
Malware attacks are always deliberate, even when they do not target particular victims; advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks are always targeted.
Malware can greatly interfere with SOF freedom of maneuver and military
communications systems. Yet, with the constant barrage of cyber events, a
deliberate attack might be missed in the “fog of war” or the intent of an event
misinterpreted, which could cause unanticipated responses.
The ultimate target of a malware-based cyberattack might not be the initial victims—in fact, a common strategy for information operators is to find
the weakest link in a supply chain and use that victim as the starting point
for an attack targeting a partner. Such attacks might result in supplies not
being where they are needed, parts being replaced by counterfeit or otherwise
inadequate substitutes, or leakage of mission plans. The use of malware is
growing, especially in terms of the sophistication of the applications. From
the SOF context, irregular and malicious adversaries are routinely aided by
nation-states for whom they are merely proxies. The trendline is growing,
and these irregular forces have the capability to conduct “morally ambiguous
operations while maintaining plausible deniability.”107
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Malware and Maritime Systems Case Studies
An example of the impact of a cyberattack on a maritime operation is that
of the EternalBlue exploit tool NotPetya worm and the Danish shipping
company, A.P. Møller-Maersk. The story starts in April 2017 when the hacking group, The Shadow Brokers, provided a large number of cyber exploit
tools allegedly created by the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to WikiLeaks.108 One of those tools was called
EternalBlue, an exploit for a vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system’s Server Message Block (SMB) service.109 Although Microsoft
had released a patch during the previous month, it had not been universally
applied by the user community.110 Furthermore, no patch had been released
for discontinued versions of the operating system, including Windows XP,
which had an end-of-life in April 2014.111
The first EternalBlue-based cyberattack started on 12 May 2017, when
the WannaCry ransomware worm started circulating around the world. In
the first 24 hours, WannaCry infected tens of thousands of computers in
99 countries throughout the Americas, Asia, and Europe; by the end of the
second day, more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries were infected.
WannaCry is not known to have specifically targeted any of its victims.
It was a worm that traveled around the internet infecting susceptible systems, which included approximately 80 percent of the computers in the UK’s
National Health System that were still using Windows XP.112 WannaCry died
down a few days later after Microsoft released an emergency patch for older
operating systems, and a cybersecurity researcher found a “kill switch” that
halted further propagation.113
This was not the end of EternalBlue, however. On 27 June 2017, malicious
actors released a new worm called NotPetya, which also employed the EternalBlue exploit. Even though Microsoft’s patch in response to WannaCry
would have also prevented damage from NotPetya, there were still hundreds
of thousands of unpatched systems around the world. Unlike WannaCry,
which was possibly intended to be a money maker for the attackers, NotPetya
appears to have been designed to cause destruction of files and computer systems. Although sites in the Ukraine were the primary targets, any unpatched
Windows system could be victimized.
One such victim of NotPetya was Maersk, whose information technology (IT) systems were shutdown network-wide, including their terminal in
30

Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions
the Port of Los Angeles. All of Maersk’s network domain controllers were
compromised, except one in Ghana that just happened to be offline at the
time of the attack due to a power failure. Using that one server, Maersk was
able to rebuild its IT communications after replacing their entire network
infrastructure of more than 45,000 computers and 4,000 servers. Maersk’s
network was down for 10 days and experienced a revenue loss estimated
around $300 million.114
From the maritime perspective, this example is not just about Maersk’s
network being down and/or disrupted for nearly two weeks, but the ripple
effect. The company is responsible for 76 ports around the world and operates
800 vessels that carry tens of millions of tons of cargo every year. Maersk’s
computer systems manage a complex operational network where a ship enters
a port every 15 minutes somewhere around the world, representing nearly
20 percent of the world’s cargo shipping capacity.115
Ransomware and other forms of malware targeting the maritime industry
were particularly prevalent by 2018. In July 2018, for example, there was a
ransomware attack affecting the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO),
the third largest shipping company in the world with more than 1,100 ships
and more than 1.5 million cargo containers.
Ransomware and
The attack focused on Windows systems and
other forms of malware
impacted the company’s internal network and
targeting the maritime
e-mail systems, forcing the shutdown of its terindustry were particuminal at the Port of Long Beach. Within a day,
larly prevalent by 2018.
there was widespread network failure across
COSCO Americas, affecting e-mail, local websites, and telephone systems in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Panama,
Peru, the U.S., and Uruguay. As a precautionary measure, COSCO suspended
bookings of hazardous and awkward cargo. Although vessels themselves
were reportedly not affected, port operations in the Western Hemisphere
were disrupted for days.116
In September 2019, the ports of Barcelona and San Diego reported ransomware infections within five days of each other. Both incidents were caused
by ransomware called Ryuk.117 Ryuk has continued to make the rounds of
maritime ports, resulting in a USCG Marine Safety Information Bulletin
after the ransomware was found at another U.S. port. In all cases, port operations were disrupted although ships were presumably unaffected.118 The Australian shipping company, Toll, was hit by two ransomware infections in the
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first half of 2020, affecting many of their regional operations; they have a
presence at more than 1,200 locations in 50 countries.119 The infection vector
in these cases appears to have been phishing e-mails, clearly indicating that
these were targeted attacks. Like many sectors in cyberspace, the maritime
industry was literally hammered with ransomware attacks in 2020, with
more than a half dozen highly publicized incidents.
In another example, a 2018 malware incident caused the malfunction
of a ship’s electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS). The
ship was designed for paperless navigation and did not carry paper charts,
so the departure of the ship from its port was delayed by several days. The
crew mistook the failure of the ECDIS as a technical failure, and it was
not until a technician arrived from the ECDIS manufacturer that they discovered that both ECDIS networks were infected with a virus. In a second
example, a ship’s main application server was infected with ransomware that
encrypted critical files, which caused complete disruption of the vessel’s IT
infrastructure and rendered the applications needed for ship operations to
be unusable. The incident kept reoccurring even after complete restoration
of the server. The root cause of the infection was found to be poor password
policies that allowed the attackers to successfully brute force remote management services.120

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Today’s supply chain—both military and civilian—has myriad vulnerabilities due to an incredibly complex, globally interconnected ecosystem that
has multiple layers of outsourcing. While using commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) products have lowered costs, decreased delivery times, improved
the ability to build innovative solutions, and improved device and system
interoperability, it has also added the risk that the buyer ultimately may not
know the true source of every component in a system. Risks to the supply
chain include the use of counterfeit components, use of unauthorized hardware manufacturers and software developers, theft, alteration, and poor
manufacturing or development processes.121
The supply chain is a target of malicious access because suppliers often
have bona fide credentials allowing them to directly connect to systems
behind firewalls and other cyber protections. If a malign actor wants to
access a particular target organization and cannot get through the target’s
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cyber defenses, a common approach is to compromise a supply chain partner’s network—which often is not as well defended—and use their access to
penetrate the intended victim’s system. This can be particularly insidious if
the supply chain partner is purposely working with a foreign government.122
Another way to gain access, particularly in today’s global manufacturing economy, is the installation of malicious software or firmware in hardware
Another way to gain access,
shipped by a nefarious or compromised
particularly in today’s global
manufacturing economy, is
vendor. The U.S. military’s dependence
the installation of malicious
on the vast DIB has created avenues for
software or firmware in hardproxies to interfere with the integrity of
ware shipped by a nefarious
the supply chain. In one example, a 2014
or compromised vendor.
report revealed that a Chinese manufacturer had installed the Zombie Zero
malware in Windows XP-embedded scanners. One victim was a company
that tracked packages being onloaded and offloaded from ships, as well as
trucks and planes. The data—which included origin, destination, contents,
and system data—was then transmitted to the company’s central database.
Although the company had excellent perimeter security, the scanners were
behind the firewall and part of the internal network. The malware was able
to compromise the central server—providing the malign actor a foothold
within the shipper’s network and a pathway to exfiltrate any databases.123
While this manufacturer has reportedly been removed from U.S. military
and government approved vendor lists, the potential issue remains with any
untrusted manufacturer and/or port authority.124
Chinese manufacturers also have a history of building keystroke loggers
into hardware and software keyboard products they produce.125 Yet, products from Chinese manufacturers are not the only susceptibility. In some
cases, Chinese products are re-packaged and fraudulently labeled as “Made
in the U.S.A.” by American companies, which adds to the complexity and
serpentine character of the supply chain issues.126

Concluding Observations
Maritime cyber events are not isolated incidents; on the contrary, they are on
the rise. Shipboard, port, and other maritime networks are as susceptible to
viruses and other malware as any other computer network. By 2018, several
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reports highlighted the growth in cybersecurity issues aboard ships and in
ports, where researchers have found numerous incidents of ransomware,
USB malware, and worms.
The implications of the growing trendline in this area are profound for
SOF, as all maritime systems need to be protected against malware and
other cyberattacks, and no network stands in isolation. The SOF community
operates at the tactical end of the conflict spectrum, yet every agency and
organization has some communication with suppliers and partners. Maritime and military networks need to address near-continuous threats to the
global supply chain. There is an increasing number of threats to maritime
and DOD operations where cyber is an instrument, vector, and/or target
of the activity. Meanwhile, the supply chain encompasses management of
personnel and materiel, as well as communication with ports, allies, civilian
vessels, and suppliers.127
Looking to the future, the SOF community will be challenged with ensuring the safety of its personnel, while simultaneously creating a meticulous
and rigorous method for protecting military networks, and the materials and
goods from the global supply chain. Across the government, several agencies
have identified best practices in managing the risk from foreign entities and
malign actors, many of which can be adapted for the SOF enterprise. These
best practices include, but are not limited to:
• developing rigid guidelines for acquisition professionals, and ensuring
contractors adhere to industry standards;
• identifying Supply Chain Risk Managers to act as stakeholders for
standards;
• ensuring contract language includes an audit capability for the supply
chain;
• educating and training professionals in the organization about the
risks inherent in the supply chain; and
• encouraging continual assessments, exercises, and auditing of the
entire process.
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Chapter 4. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
It’s expected that the cyber-physical systems revolution will be more
transformative than the IT revolution of the past four decades.
- Hausi A. Müller128

C

PS is a broad term, referring to the integration of the cyber and physical worlds by combining computers, machinery, and people to form
operational systems. CPS is a disruptive technology, combining computation, communications, and control as an enabler for smart infrastructures
and industrial applications in all aspects of human life and across all critical
infrastructure sectors. Nowhere is this truer than in transportation and, particularly, in the maritime transportation sector. This chapter will introduce
CPS and related terminology, its impact on the MTS—particularly important
in the LZ—and some of the cybersecurity aspects affecting maritime use of
CPS technologies.129 CPS technologies are described in detail in appendix 5.
The pinnacle of CPS is the IoT, the concept of combining various enabling
technologies in new ways to provide new services. IoT combines data analytics, advanced sensors, and new software to allow individual devices to
share information and participate in system-level decisions, transforming
conventional physical devices into smart ones. The enabling technologies
and functions used in IoT systems are not new. What is new is the ways in
which they are connected and work together, the ability to enable innovation, and the seemingly endless machine-to-machine and people-to-machine
applications.130
The significance of IoT cannot be overestimated. Consider that there
were 15.4 billion IoT devices worldwide in 2015. That number doubled to
30.7 billion by 2020, and it is estimated to more than double again to 75.4
billion by 2025—which represents more than nine IoT devices per person.131
Applications are found throughout critical infrastructures and other aspects
of human endeavor—including smart cities, connected healthcare, smart
agriculture, connected industry smart supply chains, smart power, and smart
retail. The transportation sector has many IoT applications, including the
connected car, smart airports, and, of course, smart ships and ports.132
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SOF and CPS
Within the United States, the USCG has responsibility for the maritime
transportation system, including ports, vessels within U.S. waters, inland
waterways, and U.S. near coastal waters.133 As the U.S. military defines a
strategy to protect MTS CPS technologies, malign actors are actively seeking to stockpile zero-day exploits—vulAs the U.S. military defines
nerabilities that have not been patched or
a strategy to protect MTS
made public—as offensive cyberweapons.
CPS technologies, malign
From the SOF perspective, the security
actors are actively seeking
risks posed by the proliferation of netto stockpile zero-day exworked devices leaves tacticians exceedploits—vulnerabilities that
ingly vulnerable. It is difficult for the
have not been patched or
military to perform operations without
made public—as offensive
being detected, and even harder to conceal
cyberweapons.
day-to-day operations. The sheer proliferation of networked devices—much of those
including COTS equipment—provides malign actors penetration points for
data mining, surveillance, and other nefarious activity.

CPS Applications and Cyber Implications in the Maritime Sector
Modern merchant and military vessels are increasingly complex and have
been introducing new forms of automation for decades. Shipboard automation has, by and large, augmented human operators and engineers, and made
operations safer and more efficient.134 Individual automated systems on ships
have evolved into an integrated ship model where systems are increasingly
intertwined.
Many shipboard functions are controlled automatically so that systems
can maintain their states according to preset parameters—such as the temperature of cooling water, fuel viscosity into the engine, speed and course
over ground, or ballast tank levels. This automation allows a vessel to get by
with fewer crew members, and also provides some functions that would be
almost impossible to carry out manually with the same level of precision.
As an example, a ship’s dynamic positioning system can maintain a nearly
exact position by using a set of thrusters to accommodate for surge, sway,
yaw, wind, current, waves, and other forces; manual control of such a system
would be practically impossible.135
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Shipboard automation has, historically, improved the ability to manage,
monitor, and control existing shipboard subsystems, such as:136
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

hull, mechanical, and electrical systems
warfare systems
shipboard electricity
propulsion and maneuvering systems
auxiliary machinery
traditional and nuclear power plants
ballast systems
navigation
cargo systems
emissions
surveillance systems

New and innovative systems are made possible by emerging CPS and
IoT technologies. Some examples of new ways to use computers and communications in maritime include:
Digital rope. Using embedded sensors, mooring lines can monitor tension, time, and temperature, and can provide early detection of wear
and failure; the lines can communicate back to an app on the bridge.137
Equipment maintenance. Traditional Interactive Electronic Technical
Manual maintenance systems can be augmented with CPS technology to
automatically and proactively collect and analyze data; rapidly improving
the speed and accuracy in detecting and repairing faulty equipment.138
Intelligent container terminals. Approximately 90 percent of the world's
cargo is transported by ship, and these cargo vessels themselves are getting
larger and larger. Maritime container traffic has become a fast-growing
segment in the shipping industry, and ports have become the bottleneck
in the movement of cargo. Optimization of the process requires communication between all elements in the near coastal supply chain— namely,
the vessels, ports, maritime terminal, and cargo handling systems. CPS/
IoT technologies have been key to the creation of a cooperative cognitive
maritime cyber-physical system to provide high-speed, low-cost communication between ships, ports, buoys, oil/gas platforms, and shore
stations, including the full or partial automation of cranes and transport
vehicles at the ports.139
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As suggested by this short list, IoT concepts can be applied to any maritime system, limited only by our imagination and creativity. The concept
of shipboard IoT, or Internet of Ships, merely recognizes that current and
emerging information and communications technology (ICT) systems,
appropriately provisioned and configured, can allow system designers to
better leverage existing mechanical and technical assets, enable innovation, build scalable systems, improve efficiency and agility, and make a big
impact on operations with small changes. New ways of using sensors and
CPS enable many types of integrated shipboard systems, from the bridge to
the engine room.140 As a master knows more about the state of the ship, this
information can also optimize supply chain operations, ensuring that fuel
and other supplies are precisely where they need to be precisely when they
need to be there.141
Maritime CPS equipment has the same potential security vulnerabilities and weaknesses as other computers. As an example, the Auto-Maskin
DCU 210E engine supervision unit, RP 210E remote touchscreen panel, and
Marine Pro Observer app are a set of hardware devices and smartphone
apps used to monitor and control ship engines.142 In 2018, they were found
to have several authentication and encryption vulnerabilities—including
the use of an undocumented remote access
Maritime CPS equipment
server using hard-coded username and
has the same potential
password; an undocumented protocol with
security vulnerabilities
which to communicate with other devices
and weaknesses as other
without any validation procedure; cleartcomputers.
ext transmission of sensitive information;
and an embedded web server that transmits
the administrator personal identification number in plain text. These flaws
could allow an attacker to access and control any connected engines, determine what sensors are present and in use on the ship’s network, determine
system configurations and settings, and send arbitrary control messages to
the engine control units.143
IoT camera systems have also been targeted by bad actors. In 2017, a
Louisiana-based maritime company reported that cameras on a quarter of its
small fleet of boats had been compromised. In this case, Dahua DHI-HCVR
systems were accessed remotely via the Web by exploiting a weakness in the
camera’s authentication procedures; the camera’s contrast settings were set
to darken the resolution, effectively blinding the camera.144 Other reports
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emerged that this same camera had previous issues where remote users could
circumvent authentication and 13 other vulnerabilities that dated back as far
as 2013.145 In 2018, camera images from Moroccan-flagged fishing vessel Mist
were posted to Twitter and claimed to have been taken remotely over the
internet. The reports could not be confirmed because of missing metadata,146
but the images appeared legitimate and certainly plausible.147

Figure 7. Shodan is used to find vulnerable IoT systems. Source: Shodan/used
with permission

Communications systems are particularly vulnerable targets because,
by definition, they have a connection to outside, public networks. With IoT
devices, however, the problem is exacerbated by internet tools that aid in
finding vulnerable communications systems (figure 7). One of the first widely
reported attacks on a communication antenna targeted the Cobham Sailor
900 very small aperture terminal system,148 which had a buffer overflow vulnerability allowing an attacker to bypass login authentication and execute
remote code.149 This problem is not unique to one product or one manufacturer, and many reports subsequently emerged about vulnerable communications terminals, buffer overflows, and weak password management
(e.g., a null username or a username of bridge with a password of 12345).150
Accessing a communications terminal via IoT databases has also been
reported as a vector to do significantly more damage, including turning the
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devices against people. Presentations at Black Hat 2014 and Black Hat 2018
demonstrated vulnerabilities in satellite communications (SATCOM) terminals that included software backdoors, insecure communications protocols,
and buffer overflows. If exploited, these vulnerabilities could:151
•
•
•
•
•

disrupt, intercept, or modify onboard SATCOM
attack crew’s devices
control SATCOM antenna positioning and transmissions
perform high intensity radiated field cyber-physical attacks
reverse engineer product backdoors in order to gain access

As noted earlier, automated ship systems have been in use for many
decades. The vulnerability of software-controlled systems became evident in
the early days of automated ballast systems. Ms Zenobia was on her maiden
voyage from Sweden in June 1980. During the first leg of the trip, Zenobia
started listing to port due to excess water in the ballast tanks; after being
righted, she continued on her journey. At Larnaca, Cyprus, her list reoccurred due to a software error in the computerized pumping system and
she was towed out of the harbor as a precautionary measure. The automatic
system continued to pump water, and when Zenobia reached a 45 degree list
to the port, the Larnaca port captain refused her re-entry. Zenobia capsized
in 138 feet (42 meters) of water, with no loss of life.152 Although not a cyberattack—in that there was no external manipulation of the software—this
is an object lesson that automated software systems are a vector for harm.
Software can be manipulated through the use of malware or bogus updates,
and manual overrides can save ships, cargo, and lives.
Two additional examples help to illustrate the fragility of vessel stability and how software vulnerabilities can be a potential vector for harm to
ships. In 2015, high-end car carrier Hoegh Osaka ran aground after leaving
Southampton and was stranded in The Solent—the strait separating the Isle
of Wight from the English mainland—for 19 days. Due to the vessel being
unstable before leaving port, Hoegh Osaka developed a 40 degree starboard
list, leaving the rudder and propeller out of the water. Shifting cargo resulted
in a hull breach, allowing seawater to enter. In this case, the ship was near
a deep-water channel and sinking would have blocked container ships, passenger ships, and ferries. The investigator’s report indicated that there was a
significant difference between the actual and estimated cargo weight, resulting in unsafe stability calculations.153 In 2019, vehicle carrier Golden Ray with
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a cargo of 4,200 vehicles was grounded in St. Simons Sound, Georgia, United
States. The vessel started to list approximately 23 minutes after it left port;
the pilot on board deliberately grounded the ship so that she would be out
of the channel. She later rolled over on her port side. Even though Golden
Ray was grounded out of the channel, the Port of Brunswick was closed for
four days; if it had capsized in the channel, the effect on the port would have
been far longer lasting.154 The instability of these ships was most likely due
to human error, but the load management software certainly demonstrates
a lucrative target for cyber attackers.

Figure 8. The layout of an automated container terminal. © 2018 IEEE. Reprinted,
with permission, from Yang et al., “Internet of Things for Smart Ports: Technologies and Challenges,” IEEE Instrumentation and Measurement Magazine 21, no. 1

CPS and IoT transformation of the MTS is not limited to just ships.
Today’s ports comprise a complex infrastructure of ICT, machinery, business processes and transactions between trading and supply chain partners,
regulations, and stakeholders. This includes port owners, port authorities,
port operators, unions, shipping and other transportation companies, and,
in some cases, the military.155 Digitalization in the form of combining IoT,
CPS, big data, and machine learning (ML) provides an incredible opportunity for ports to optimize their operation. Improving the organization and
timing of ship movements in a busy port to optimize transit, berthing, and
loading/unloading, for example, can save both ports and shipping companies
tens of thousands of dollars for every hour of decreased down time.156 Using
a combination of sensors, gauges, cameras, radio frequency identification,
and other IoT devices—coupled with advanced technologies such as GNSS,
internet, Wi-Fi, and 4G/5G mobile communications—container terminals
can be automated to optimize the interoperation of cargo ships, rail mounted
gantry cranes, and automated guided vehicles. See figure 8.157
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These technologies and ideas are being implemented at ports today. As an
example, the Port of Rotterdam—which handles 140,000 ships and 461 million tons of cargo annually—is working with IBM Corp. to build the “world’s
smartest port” using IoT technology. Sensors measuring water temperature,
water depth, speed and direction of current, tide, speed and direction of
wind, berth availability, and other factors at the 41 square mile (106 square
kilometer) port will feed centralized information to a dashboard app on
connected vessels. This data will streamline port operations to reduce wait
times; optimize dock, load, and unload times; and maximize the throughput
of vessels at cargo terminals.158 Similar intelligent ship management, intelligent traffic flow, and smart port logistics systems are being built at the Port
of Le Havre.159
These initiatives are massive implementations of hardware, software, and
communications, including the development of new apps. But, like all IoT
components, the potential for attacks on CPS hardware and software is ever
present. Suppose, for example, a bad actor hacks or otherwise manipulates
a sensor subsystem to send bogus AIS or smart port app messages; or an
attacker spoofs AIS clearance time to enter port, marine traffic signal, berthing data, or tidal window messages causing a disruption in vessel traffic.
The resulting confusion could disrupt port operations potentially for long
periods of time.

Concluding Observations
While many technologies—including CPS and the internet itself—can be an
equalizing factor between a large and small organization, agency, or military
force, too much dependence
While many technologies—including
upon technology can also be
CPS and the internet itself—can be an
an Achilles’ heel. IoT devices
equalizing factor between a large and
on maritime vessels and at
small organization, agency, or military
ports can allow a single person
force, too much dependence upon
to do the work of several, thus
technology can also be an Achilles’
becoming a force multiplier,
heel.
but overdependence on technology can cause systemic
errors, delays, and inefficiencies if that technology fails. Computer-based
ICS use processor chips, sensors, and other hardware components that are
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manufactured overseas; malware or backdoors could be inserted into software or, Stuxnet-type vulnerabilities could be built into hardware.160 Because
of the huge number of IoT devices and the relative security weaknesses of
those devices, CPS is an attractive target for cyberterrorists and adversarial
cyberwarriors.161
While CPS and IoT have unique cybersecurity challenges, defense of the
computers at the heart of these systems starts with following best practices
for securing networked systems such as a defense-in-depth strategy that
includes anti-malware, firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems,
and user training. Using red teams to perform external network reconnaissance, vulnerability scanning, and penetration testing can also yield a tremendous amount of information to help better secure a network.162 Another
emerging strategy in the defense of CPS is the use of digital twins, a virtual
representation of a physical object or process. The U.S. military is already
using digital twins to secure semiconductors and to test GPS.163 Combining
IoT software systems with the real time digital twin of managed hardware
provides a better understanding of the entire CPS system—including the
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and potential exploits. With this knowledge,
operators can better adjust the efficacy and security of their systems.164 One
such maritime initiative is the ProProS research project at the Fr. Lürssen
shipyard in Bremen, Germany, which is building a digital twin to control and
optimize their manufacturing and assembly processes.165 Looking ahead, this
model for the future—robust systems for counter intrusion as well as digital
twins—is likely the most prudent, adaptable, and inherently sophisticated
path forward.
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Chapter 5. Autonomous Vessels
The [vessel] of the future will have only two [crewmembers], a man
and a dog. The man will be there to feed the dog. The dog will be
there to keep the man from touching the equipment. - adapted from
Warren Bennis166

A

utonomous maritime vessels, also called maritime autonomous surface
ships (MASS), represent a natural convergence of thousands of years
of evolving ship and harbor technology with decades of evolving computing
and communications technology. Conceptually, autonomy seems like a good
fit in the maritime transportation system, particularly in the LZ where there
is an abundance of vessel traffic and natural hazards that automation can
help manage and control. But, as discussed earlier in this report, computerbased systems, most notably operational technology (OT), ICS, and IoT, are
susceptible to many types of cyberattack. This chapter will review some of
the drivers for autonomous vessels and their cyber vulnerabilities.167 Appendix 6 contains a background introduction to the topic.
Autonomous military vessels have been a specialized area of research in
the general field of autonomous ships. Autonomy for military vessels brings
many of the same advantages as in commercial shipping but, of course, also
adds the fact that autonomy can be a force multiplier and remove humans
from places of harm. The U.S. Navy has had a program for developing an
unmanned surface vessel (USV) fleet since 2012. Several prototype vessels
have been built or are under development, and have already been tested
operationally as part of a carrier strike force, and a fleet of seven is expected
by 2023.168 The Navy has already identified many potential uses for autonomous vessels, including roles in missile attack forces; mine search, detection,
neutralization, and delivery; antisubmarine and surface warfare; support
of SOF; maritime interdiction and security; and EW.169 While most of the
USVs are unarmed, the Navy is also testing armed, unmanned patrol boats
for port security, such as a 40 foot (12 meter) remote-operated USV—armed
with a .50 caliber machine gun station—to protect warships at anchor.170 As
with a manned vessel, operation of a USV will be more difficult in the LZ
than in more open water.
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SOF and Autonomous Vessels
Militaries, policymakers, and malign actors around the globe recognize
the competitive advantage of autonomous vessels. Much like their airborne
counterparts, autonomous vessels are cheaper, operate with less human risk,
and can operate for lengths of time well beyond human capacity. An autonomous vessel allows SOF to act from a distance in common operations such
as hostage rescue and antipiracy. Unmanned vessels can transmit sensory
data to a remote command post, and some can get close enough to hostile
maritime vessels to override their controls. Yet, because of their sophistication, autonomous vessels are especially vulnerable to increasingly complex
and destructive actions, which poses a unique threat to SOF.

Cyber Threats to Autonomous Vessels
Artificial intelligence (AI), IoT, and mobility systems have been major disrupters in the maritime industry. Autonomous systems in the MTS are at
the intersection of innovative uses of advanced technology and vulnerability to all imaginable cyberattack vectors. Cyber technology is the enabler
of incredible potential advances but also provides potentially existential
threat and attack vectors.171 The current environment might be summarized
as “automation, integration, and remote monitoring meet the internet”:172
• Automation. Maritime machinery and systems are increasingly controlled by software
• Integration. Multiple shipboard systems are increasingly interconnected
• Remote Monitoring/Control. Land-based offices use ship-to-shore
communication to continuously monitor and/or control shipboard
equipment
• all these systems are connected to the internet with its 4.5 billion users
Each individual segment above has its own cyber vulnerabilities. As an
interconnected system, the potential vulnerabilities and cyberattack vectors are so complex as to be impossible to be fully understood, regardless
of whether this is applied to manned or unmanned maritime vessels. The
defense requires good software discipline, policies, and controls that limit
how one system interacts with other systems, as well as implementing the
best cybersecurity design principles, including:173
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• Isolation. Run tasks so that they cannot communicate with other
tasks unless there is a trusted relationship.
• Modularity. A task only needs to know how to interface with another
task but not the internal structure of that other task.
• Minimization of implementation/least common mechanism. Avoid
sharing parts of security mechanisms among different users, processes, and/or parts of the system.
• Complete mediation. All accesses to objects should be checked to
ensure they are allowed every time access is attempted (i.e., do not
cache access permissions).
• Least privilege. Processes should be assigned the least level of privilege necessary to perform their task.
• Reluctance to trust/minimize trust surface. Assume that the environment in which the system resides is insecure.
To implement any security defense mechanism or protection, a risk
assessment must be performed to identify the actual threats, vulnerabilities, and exposures, as well as to prioritize those risks.174 Cyber risks for
autonomous vessels are due to the addition and reliance on ICT, but as all
autonomous vessels do not have the same level of autonomy, the risk factors
will vary based upon the vessel’s exposure in cyberspace. Tam and Jones175
propose a risk assessment model for assessing autonomous vessels—shown in
table 2—by defining three axes: level of vessel autonomy, value of the exploit
to the attacker, and ease with which an attack can occur.176
1. On the ship autonomy axis, the highest tier represents the most complex
target, a fully autonomous vessel, and the vulnerability is a function of
attack vector, target vulnerability, and effect on the target (e.g., AIS jamming could result in a collision).
2. The attacker reward is a function of attacker type and goal combined with
target type and effect (e.g., a cybercriminal launching a ransomware attack
could put a company out of business or garner a huge payoff).
3. Ease of exploit is a function of attacker type and available resources combined with the target type and resources (e.g., a skilled hacking organization with standard tools could easily exploit a small vessel’s network that
does not have adequate cyber defenses). Since this axis measures ease of an
attack rather than difficulty, the highest tier represents the simplest attack.
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Table 2. Tiers of ship autonomy, attacker reward, and ease of exploit. Source:
Tam and Jones/Cyber-Risk Assessment for Autonomous Ships
Tier

Ship Autonomy

Attacker Reward
Little to no value for
attacker; minimal impact

Ease of Exploit

1

Minimal crew
required

APT, requires capabilities of
a nation-state

2

Partial autonomation; Small value to attacker
local crew for simple
tasks

Advanced skills, requiring
considerable resources
(organization)

3

Conditional
autonomy, potential
intervention by local
crew

Average to moderate
value to attacker

Moderate skills, requiring
significant resources
(professional)

4

High autonomy,
mostly self-running

Valuable to attacker and
third parties

Minimal skills or resources
required (basic)

5

Complete autonomy

Extremely valuable to all
players; large-scale or
significant impact

Little to no skills needed
(e.g., script kiddies)

The risk matrix can be further refined by identifying specific areas of
vulnerability.177 Earlier chapters in this monograph have already described
some of the attack surfaces in the MTS, but specific areas within autonomous
systems include:178
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

positioning systems
sensors
firmware patches/upgrades
voyage data recorders
intra-vessel network
vessel-to-land communication
remote operation systems
docking systems

While autonomous systems have their own unique issues, the possible
attacks on MASS are like those described earlier for the MTS as a whole—
such as code injection; tampering and modifying sensors; GNSS spoofing;
AIS spoofing; signal jamming; and communication link eavesdropping and
disruption.179
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Concluding Observations
Cybersecurity planning across SOF should follow the “Vulnerabilities
Trumps Threats Maxim,” which suggests that it is important to focus on
understanding and addressing the vulnerabilities in a system rather than on
the perceived threats.180 Organizing a defense around vulnerabilities means
to plan based upon things that can be identified, mitigated, and, possibly,
eliminated. Organizing the defense around threats is a poor approach,
because the threat landscape is constantly changing. Further, if defense is
designed around threats that are incorrect, the defense may be inadequate
against an unanticipated threat actor. Focus on vulnerabilities; even if the
threats are incorrect, a strong defense will be built.
One of the most promising strategies to mitigate the complex vulnerabilities of autonomous vessels is construction of a digital twin, described
earlier in this monograph. Autonomous vessels, including ports and mooring
systems, are enabled by advanced digital technology. Building digital twins
of these systems is of paramount importance to understanding system complexity and appreciating the new cyber vectors for attacking these systems.181
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Chapter 6. Implications For SOF
No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy. - Helmuth von
Moltke the Elder182
Mann traoch, Gott läuch (man plans, God laughs) - Yiddish proverb183
There’s a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it’s not about
who’s got the most bullets. It’s about who controls the information.
What we see and hear how we work, what we think ... it’s all about
the information! - Sneakers184

H

istorically, cyber defense has been viewed as trying to keep up with
an ever-changing environment of cyber threats and vulnerabilities;
a cycle of “find vulnerabilities, fix them, repeat.” This whack-a-mole form
of defense all but guarantees that defense will always lag behind methods of
attack. The overriding implication drawn from this monograph is that IW in
the LZ will require a new way of thinking. This does not mean merely adapting old methods to a new battle terrain but of adopting a new philosophy in
warfare. Consider the futility of the Maginot Line as France, in the 1930s,
prepared to defend themselves against the previous war with Germany.185
The same is true in addressing issues of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare.
Today’s cyber defense demands two fundamental changes in philosophy
and outlook. First, understand that the assets to protect and defend are not
physical but, rather, logical or virtual. Methods designed to protect physical
assets are not adequate to protect cyber assets; cyber defenders must protect
data that needs to be protected everywhere it resides. This requires new organizational constructs. Second, hierarchical communication structures—be
they human or machine-based—give the attacker the edge; if an attack needs
to be reported up through a chain-of-command and sent to a vendor before
a defense is distributed, attackers have plenty of time to do a lot of damage.
Instead, defenders need flat, knowledge-based mechanisms that can be used
to share information amongst appropriate parties at the speed of an attack
which, in cyberspace, is literally the speed of light. Defenders need to adapt
to reclaim the cyber advantage from the attacker.186
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Just as autonomous vessels are a disruptive technology in the MTS, maritime activities in the LZ are a disruptive force in terms of IW. Leveraging
disruptive technologies requires special planning and new outlooks. While
traditional risk management processes and procedures are important to
apply to these new problems, planners also need to apply non-traditional
methods to risk assessment, management, and planning. Rather than focus
risk assessment on specific systems or subsystems within a vessel or an operational domain, scenario-based planning provides a larger perspective to
identifying and responding to threats, both cyber and non-cyber. Whereas
the common cyber risk management approach looks at a static attack on
individual parts of a system, scenario-based planning provides a tabletop,
exercise-like opportunity to consider the impacts of a natural or manmade attack on a cyber system, a planned
response to such an event, and the next
Rather than focus risk
steps that might occur due to nature or an
assessment on specific sysintelligent actor. In this way, by wargamtems or subsystems within
ing and red teaming a host of scenarios,
a vessel or an operational
domain, scenario-based
planners can better prepare a multifaceted
planning provides a larger
cyber defense.187
perspective to identifying
One scenario-based planning methand responding to threats,
odology employed by USCG is Evergreen.
both cyber and non-cyber.
This process is not the typical “what happens if someone spoofs our GPS?” type of
planning; on the contrary, it is quite untraditional. Evergreen focuses on
future planning based upon a vast number of variables—including technology, politics, the economy, the environment, population demographics,
and the state of critical infrastructures. Because the future is uncertain, the
Evergreen process starts with several plausible futures; participants then
discuss actions that might be taken today to advance to, or avoid, the various
futures and achieve success down the road. Participants very quickly come
to understand the complex interrelationships between global parameters and
variables to identify key uncertainties and major trends. While not cybersecurity-specific, Evergreen is a useful process in the cyber domain; it demonstrates the interconnectedness of the variables in the scenario. Ultimately,
the process helps participants to better understand the big picture and offers
better planning advice to organizational leadership.188 This unconstrained
thinking broadens the perspective of planners so that they might implement
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policies and processes that will lead to an advantageous position further
down the road; what some call “reverse engineering the future.”189 While
planners do need to anticipate all contingencies, it is best to proactively try
to create the optimal conditions to avoid undesirable long-term outcomes.

Concluding Thoughts
This monograph has only touched on the many technology drivers of both
offensive and defensive actions at the crossroads of maritime operations
and cyberspace. Each will have a major impact on the way offensive and
defensive operations are conducted in all domains of war and conflict. These
technologies will interpret inputs, make decisions, and initiate responses at
computer speeds so that humans will not be able to keep up with each individual action. Computers will also be able to track thousands of seemingly
unrelated events to anticipate potential adverse actions, and tell a party when
and how to launch preemptive cyberattacks or position their cyber assets
accordingly; this also applies to kinetic attacks and defenses.190 The larger
lesson of cybersecurity is that defense is not about the systems, it is about
the amount, quality, integrity, timeliness, and availability of information.
For an organization like USSOCOM, that sits at the tip of the spear;
they must make rapid decisions, planning, organization, recruitment, retention, and resilience the keys towards building a robust, multidomain defense
against current and future irregular adversaries. The future is likely to see
more data-driven operations and reliance on the globally integrated DIB.
Given the growing complexity of the wartime environment and the types of
planning required to mitigate and respond to threats, the maritime special
operator of the future must have the ability to integrate, synthesize, and
comprehend a wide amount of complex information and process several
plausible scenarios at once. It will be imperative for commanders and forces
in the field to quickly orient towards evolving changes on the battlefield.
This reality has major implications for SOF recruitment and retention. The
SOF of the future must be able to recruit the most agile-minded warriors,
and retain intellectually capable and intuitive fighters. Likewise, cadres of
offensive and defensive cyber specialists, whose primary function is not
kinetic warfighting, could be integrated within the most tactical of SOF
communities. Furthermore, USSOCOM will need to develop internal processes and a framework to mitigate vulnerabilities in the supply chain and
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enterprise-level integrated systems. The onus will be upon the command to
stay flexible for the fight, integrate innovative practices, appeal to the next
generation of warriors, and organize to respond to new challenges.

54

Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions

Appendix 1. The Littoral Zone (LZ) in
Context
Oceanographers classify different parts of the ocean in different ways based
upon what aspects of the environment they are studying, e.g., topography,
biology, or physics. One of the common classification systems is based on
depth. The pelagic zone essentially covers the water column from the surface
to near the bottom of the sea; the very bottom is the benthic zone. The pelagic
zone can be further subdivided, based upon the penetration of light; the
photic zone is the top layer where at least some light penetrates—and, in the
upper range, photosynthesis can occur. The aphotic zone is the dark water.
Each of these zones has further subclassifications beyond the scope of this
monograph, outlined in table 3.191
Table 3. Classification of oceanic zones. Adapted from Webb,
Introduction to Oceanography.
Zone

Description

Pelagic

Surface to Near Bottom

Photic

Light Penetration

Aphotic

Dark Water

Benthic

Bottom of Sea

Littoral

Near Shore

While the subdivisions within the pelagic zone are largely based upon
depth, it is obvious that there is a natural relationship between the height
of the water column and distance from shore. The most nearshore region is
the LZ (figure 9). The LZ itself is divided into many subareas, but this zone
is where the ocean meets the land; it is generally held to extend out to the
near edge of the continental shelf, to depths of approximately 200 feet (60
meters).192
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Figure 9. Diagram of the features of the LZ. Source: U.S. Navy
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Appendix 2. GNSS and GPS Technical
Details
GNSS Overview
Satellite navigation systems employ trilateration as a way in which to determine the latitude, longitude, and altitude of a point on or above the surface
of the Earth. Trilateration requires communication with three satellites; it
is the relative distance of the receiver to each of these satellites that provides
the geolocation capability.193
Each GNSS system uses its own constellation of satellites. Each global
GNSS constellation employs between 24–35 satellites in a medium Earth
orbit (MEO) at an altitude of about 12,000–14,500 miles (19,300–23,300 kilometers). At this altitude, each satellite has an orbital period of 11–14 hours,
making one and a half to two orbits a day; they are visible by a given receiver
for several hours at a time, as shown in figure 10.194

Figure 10. Geostationary, GNSS MEO, and low Earth orbit satellites are
compared. Source: Wikimedia
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A GNSS receiver can determine its ground position using trilateration
from multiple satellite signals; it is, in essence, a passive ranging system.
While the satellite transmits a signal at about 50 watts, after traveling thousands of miles the received signal might be as low as 10-16 watts.195 A maritime
GNSS receiver overlays its position information on a chart to determine such
information as latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, heading, and estimated
time of arrival to a destination, as shown in figure 11.

Figure 11. A typical maritime GPS chartplotter display is shown. Source: Garmin/
used with permission

GNSS satellites transmit signals in the UHF L band, which employs radio
frequencies in the range of 1–2 GHz.196 The satellites typically transmit on
at least two frequencies simultaneously, commonly called Link 1 (L1) and
Link 2 (L2). All satellites in a constellation share the L1 and L2 frequencies,
using a multiplexing scheme called code-division multiple access (CDMA),
a form of spread spectrum technology also used by mobile phones. Each
GNSS satellite is assigned a unique pseudorandom noise (PRN)197 sequence,
which is merely a long string of zeros and ones. The PRN is used to modulate
the satellite’s transmission on the L band. Receivers know the PRN assigned
to each satellite, thus allowing them to synchronize with the signal from a
particular satellite. While the CDMA signal is at an extremely low power
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level, the code correlation properties of the PRN allow the receiver to recover
the signal and the information it contains.198
Although geolocation using trilateration only requires three satellites,
precise GNSS position and timing requires that the receiver acquire a signal
from four satellites. GNSS positioning is based upon a passive reference to a
satellite that is moving at a speed of about 2.5 miles a second (4 kilometers a
second). Trilateration using three satellites provides an approximate location
with an error of up to one mile (1500 meters) due to a lack of synchronization
between the satellite’s highly accurate cesium clock and the receiver’s less
accurate clock. A given receiver’s clock error—or bias—affects all observed
satellite signal transit times in the same way; meaning that all of the ranges
will be too short or too long by some common ratio. This is known as a
pseudorange. By employing a fourth satellite, the pseudorange error can be
reduced so that the position estimate is within a few feet (1 meter), effectively
transferring the high accuracy of the satellite clock to the surface receiver.199
In the vernacular of GNSS, the constellation of satellites is called the space
segment and the collection of receivers is referred to as the user segment.
The global network of ground facilities that track the satellites, monitor their
transmissions, and send commands and data to them is called the control
segment.200

GPS Technical Background
Currently managed by the U.S. Space Force, GPS—officially, NAVSTAR,
the Global Positioning System—began as a joint project of the U.S. Air Force
and U.S. Navy in the late 1960s, and is generally considered to be the first
GNSS.201 While the military originally intended itself to be the sole user of
GPS, the U.S. government’s posture since the first satellite launch in 1978 has
been that civilians would have access to the system. Civilian GPS products
became widely available in the 1990s as the system became fully operational;
the signal precision was purposely degraded by the introduction of controlled
timing errors, a feature known as Selective Availability (SA). The civilianoriented service is known as the Standard Positioning Service (SPS); the SA
feature was removed by EO in 2000 and is no longer available in current
satellites.202 GPS also provides a Precise Positioning Service (PPS) for the
U.S. military and allied nations.203

59

JSOU Report 21 -4
GPS uses a constellation of up to 31 satellites, each of which orbits the
Earth twice daily. GPS employs three frequencies in the L band for transmission of navigation messages, denoted L1 (1575.42 megahertz [MHz]204), L2
(1227.60 MHz), and L5 (1176.45 MHz).205
GPS satellites transmit navigation messages on each frequency at an
extremely low bit rate (50 bits per second); it takes 12.5 minutes for an entire
message to be transmitted and then received by a ground station. Navigation
messages include the following information:206
•
•
•
•
•

GPS date, time, and week number
satellite status and health
ephemeris (position and velocity) data
clock bias parameters
almanac (coarse ephemeris data for all GPS satellites, allows receivers
to know which satellites are available for tracking)

A GPS satellite is continually transmitting navigation messages. A GPS
receiver derives positional information by passively determining the location of, and range to, each of the satellites to which it is listening. Part of
this process necessitates the receiver recovering the clock signal from the
satellite transmission; the processing power of the receiver has a great deal
to do with the accuracy and precision of the reported location. The PRN
codes described above are essential to the recovery of the clock, so they are
sometimes referred to as ranging codes.207
The L1 band is used to transmit navigation messages and uses two PRN
codes. The first code, called the coarse/acquisition (C/A) code, was designed
to support the SPS and is freely available to the public for civilian use and
standard precision applications; this signal is referred to as L1C. The second
code is called the precision (P) code and is intended to support military
PPS.208 The P code is encrypted and becomes known as a Y code, but common
nomenclature is to refer to this as a P(Y) code. The P(Y) code provides better
interference resistance than the C/A code, which makes military GPS more
robust and resistant to spoofing than civilian GPS. The military makes the
P(Y) code decryption key available to authorized users, including military
allies.209
Historically, the L2 band was used to transmit the P(Y) code and was
intended exclusively for military applications. On newer GPS satellites, the
C/A code is also transmitted on L2—referred to as L2C—providing a second
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publicly available code for civilian users. Even newer GPS satellites are transmitting a third civilian signal on the L5 band.210
The National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) defines standards
for the interface between marine electronics equipment. The NMEA 0183
interface standard message format is character-based and is commonly used
on commercial and military vessels.211 As an example, a message containing
GNSS fix data might appear as:
$GPGGA,123519,1231.225,N,07002.642,W,1,08,0.9,11.4,M,46.9,M,,*62

Among other things, this message indicates that it was sent by a GPS
device at 12:35:19 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC),212 is at a position of
12°31.225'N, 070°02.642'W and an altitude of 11.4 meters (e.g., the receiver is
located at the top of the ship’s superstructure), has an SPS fix quality, and is
tracking eight satellites.213
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Appendix 3. AIS Technical Details
AIS Overview
The AIS is a tracking system whereby vessels and shore stations within a
10–20 nautical mile range can exchange position, course, and other vesselrelated information. With this system, vessels at sea are aware of each other’s
presence; maritime authorities in littoral states can identify and monitor vessels and cargo in their area of responsibility; and navigation, meteorological,
safety, and other items of information can be exchanged between ships and
shore stations, including ports. The need for AIS was prompted by the oil spill
caused when Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska
in 1989. AIS was designed as a maritime situational awareness system in the
1990s and was adopted internationally in the 2002 International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).214
SOLAS Chapter V “Safety of Navigation” requires ships of a certain size
and/or function to carry AIS transceivers as a necessary safety measure,
along with radar, radios, and life jackets. In the U.S., this same mandate is
found in the United States Code of Federal Regulations.215 Ships of 300 or
more gross tons traveling internationally, commercial power vessels of 65
or more feet (19.8 or more meters) in length, and power vessels certified to
carry more than 150 passengers are among the vessels required to carry AIS
Class A devices. Warships are specifically exempted from these requirements,
although most modern warships have AIS capability, including the ability
to shut it off and/or operate in an encrypted mode.216 Class B devices can
be employed on vessels that use AIS but have no legal requirement to do so,
such as large yachts and small fishing boats. AIS devices generally transmit
position information messages every 2–180 seconds, depending upon the
ship’s class, speed, and rate-of-turn. Class A devices generally transmit more
detailed information with more power than do Class B devices.217
AIS has evolved to be an essential part of a ship’s navigation system
and is used today primarily for situational awareness and collision avoidance among ships, vessel traffic management, and coastal surveillance.218 A
ship using an AIS receiver can view the local traffic and quickly determine
another ship’s name, its International Maritime Organization registration
number, size (length, beam, and draft), position (latitude and longitude),
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course, heading, destination, cargo, status (anchored, moored, underway
under power or sail, etc.), and other information as shown figures 12 and
13. AIS gathers its location information from the ship’s GNSS so is highly
dependent upon the integrity of the navigation system.

Figure 12. Typical Class A AIS display and control unit with radar-like display of
nearby targets is shown. Source: Clipper, Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 3.0

Figure 13. Chartplotter display including AIS data, shows ships in the local area.
Source: Wikimedia Commons public domain
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There are many active components in the AIS network, shown in figure
14. In addition to ships and boats, other mobile stations include AIS SAR
transponders, man overboard transmitters, Emergency Position Indicating
Radio Beacons, AIS-equipped satellites, and SAR aircraft. Fixed AIS stations
include AIS base stations, repeaters, and specially equipped aids-to-navigation. GNSS satellites are not a direct component of AIS, but they provide
essential geographic positioning information to all the mobile components.219

Figure 14. Stations in the AIS network are shown. Source: Gary C. Kessler

AIS Technical Background
AIS is a radio-broadcast communication system, using very high frequency
channels 87B (161.975 MHz) and 88B (162.025 MHz) in the maritime band.
Radio transmission aspects of AIS, including frequency sharing and time
slot reservation schemes, as shown in figure 15, are described in International Telecommunication Union, Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R)
Recommendations M.585-8 and M.1371-5.220 The primary AIS identifier is the
Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), uniquely assigned to all vessels
by international standardization and local maritime authorities.221
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Figure 15. Frequency sharing in the AIS network uses self-organized time division
multiple access. Source: AIS Reporter/used with permission

The AIS communication protocols are defined in a family of NMEA
standards:
• NMEA 0183 defines character-based message formats at speeds up to
38,400 bits per second over a serial connection222
• NMEA 2000® describes binary message formats at speeds up to
250,000 bits per second running over the Controller Area Network
(CAN) bus223
• OneNet describes a protocol using binary messages over the internet
protocol (IP) version 6 and Ethernet at gigabit speeds, and introduces
security mechanisms for transmissions224
The NMEA AIS protocols are used for inter-device communication
aboard a vessel. NMEA 0183 has been adopted in ITU-R Rec. M.1371 for
over-the-air transmission of AIS information.
The following example of a Type 1 (position report Class A) message
demonstrates how AIS transmissions might appear to an AIS device. Suppose a device has the following information to send:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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MMSI = 367354360
Navigation status = Underway using engine
Rate of turn = 11.999° per minute to starboard
Latitude = 41.3541750°
Longitude = -072.0903817°
Speed over ground = 5.21 knots
Course over ground = 5.099°
True heading = 17.000°
UTC timestamp = 29 seconds
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NMEA 0183-formatted messages are among the most common in use
by commercial vessels, including some recreational and military vessels.
NMEA 0183 messages are used for inter-device communication on a ship
and have been adopted in International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Recommendation M.1371 for over the air transmission of AIS information.
An NMEA 0183/ITU M.1371 message with the information above would be
transmitted over the air as:
!AIVDM,1,1,,A,15NEQv02hlJmwiFGbKn@<hRr0000,0*43

NMEA 2000-formatted messages are used for inter-device communication aboard a ship. This standard is common on recreational vessels and
those commercial and military vessels using modern AIS equipment. An
NMEA 2000 message with the information above might appear as:
040EF801FF0289F811001C01F861E51577E107D57625A618757A030C0144C000970B2E1AC0F800

The OneNet standard is very new, and equipment employing this protocol
is not expected to appear before the end of 2021. Like NMEA 2000, OneNet
will be used for inter-device communication aboard a vessel.
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Appendix 4. Malware Tutorial
An Introduction to Malware
Most common definitions of cybersecurity focus on the protection of computers, servers, networks, and the internet from deliberate attack and compromise.225 The DOD definition of cyberspace security is much more global
and focused:
Actions taken within protected cyberspace to prevent unauthorized
access to, exploitation of, or damage to computers, electronic communications systems, and other information technology, including
platform information technology, as well as the information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.226

The important distinction here is the focus on the bottom-line: information. Prior to the adoption of terms such as cybersecurity and cyberspace security, the practice was called information security or information assurance,
providing the focus on the information itself rather than on the containers
and communication pathways.227 Textbooks today still talk about the socalled Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability Triad and Parkerian Hexad
when describing characteristics of information, and there is a fair amount
of overlap with the DOD terms:228
• Confidentiality refers to protecting information from unauthorized
access or disclosure.
• Integrity refers to the state of information being free from inadvertent
or deliberate manipulation.
• Availability refers to the users’ ability to access information when needed.
• Possession, or control, refers to the loss of data by the authorized user
(even if the “thief” cannot access the data).
• Authenticity, also known as authentication, refers to being able to prove
the identity of the sender of information.
• Utility refers to the usefulness of the data to the user. Examples of low
utility are possessing encrypted data without a decryption key; or receiving a message to do something after the date when the action is required.
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The last part of the DOD definition, nonrepudiation, means that the
owner of information or the sender of a message cannot deny their ownership or authorship, respectively.
Definitions of malware often focus on the intentional disruption to the
operation of computers and communications systems, including user systems, servers, local networks, and the internet.229 The real issue is that malware represents an attack on these characteristics of information; if we lose
any one of these, the success of an operation or any data-based activity
cannot be assured.
The use of malware and other attacks on computers and networks are
tools commonly used by cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, and military information operators. Individual hackers and hacker groups can be acting for
their own purposes, such as Anonymous; for hire, such as Lizard Squad,
as state-sponsored actors, such as Syrian Electronic Army; or directly on
behalf of a nation-state, such as People’s Liberation Army [PLA] Unit 61398.

Malware Types and Techniques
There are many types of malware that manifest in different ways. Almost
all malware is insinuated into a computer or network by a user opening
an attached file to an email, downloading an infected file from an internet
site, or otherwise responding to directions provided in a message from an
“unknown” user. It is important to note that the term computer is a broad
one; mobile devices such as tablets and cell phones are as susceptible to
malware as a laptop or desktop system.230
Historically, malware has been categorized as a virus, worm, or Trojan.
A virus is a nefarious program that is activated when executed by the user,
such as when double-clicking on a file attachment to an e-mail. Once active,
a virus can do almost anything on the system—slowly delete data; cause the
computer’s performance to degrade; make the computer part of a zombie
network; or allow the system to become a jumping off point for another
attack. Once installed, some viruses can automatically restart—even after
they are discovered and closed, or the system rebooted. Spyware is a particular type of virus that collects keystrokes, contents of the system clipboard,
screenshots, user logon credentials, and other information; it then uploads
what it collects to an attacker’s site. In one form or another, viruses have
been infecting computers since the 1980s. In that era, the most common
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form of distribution was via floppy disk software distribution or individual
file sharing, and it could take months or years for a virus to hit a critical
mass; by the early 1990s, commercial e-mail services and the internet greatly
accelerated the time and ease for distribution.231
Worms can replicate and forward themselves to other systems. Worms use a
variety of methods to propagate; one common method is to examine the e-mail
address book of the infected system and forward itself to all addresses found
therein. Another method is to advance via open network shares. Like viruses,
worms can do just about anything to the host computer once they are active.
Because of their ability to self-replicate, even a worm without a malicious
payload can degrade the performance of a computer by usurping processing
power, or of a network by consuming bandwidth. The concept of a worm has
been around since the early days of the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network—the forerunner of the internet. The first worm to cause any sort of
damage was The Internet Worm in 1988.232 Worms are now the common way in
which malware makes its way around the internet, and worm-based malware
can hit critical mass on the internet within minutes or hours.233
Trojans, or Trojan horses, are programs that purport to do one thing but
also contain additional, malicious functionality. Trojan horse software is
often found as an e-mail attachment or Web site download, but there is also
often some form of social engineering—manipulation of people—involved,
such as someone on an e-mail list touting a new, wonderful game or application. Remote Access Trojans (RATs) are distributed by “customer service
representatives,” asking a user to download software so that the representative can share the screen with the user. These programs allow a bad actor to
totally control the system. RATs and other Trojans are also distributed at
some gaming, music sharing, and pornography Web sites where users are
told to download special viewing software.234 While Trojan software generally works as advertised, it also inserts additional malware which remains on
the system even if the parent software is subsequently deleted; an example
is CoinTicker, a Mac OS X application that monitors the current price of
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and installs malicious backdoor programs that could allow an attacker to gain access to a user’s cryptocurrency
wallet.235 Consider also ToTok, a messaging app introduced in 2019 that
was downloaded millions of times by users around the world before being
revealed to be a United Arab Emirates (UAE) intelligence service surveillance
tool. Likewise, the smartphone video app TikTok was banned by branches
71

JSOU Report 21 -4
of the U.S. military because it was reportedly sending information back to
its Chinese developer.236 Trojans are a particular concern where operational
systems have an internet connection, because the malware and its covert
communications channels are totally hidden behind a useful facade.
Viruses and Trojans are pervasive on mobile devices, particularly the
Android operating system. Mobile devices are an especially attractive target
for attackers because of the incredible amount of personal information on
those devices, including e-mail and text messages, photographs, financial
and health information, logon credentials for a work network, and more.
Information-stealing software is as likely to target mobile devices as it is
personal computers.
Lastly, bogus hardware can also be employed as a vector with which to
upload malware to a computing device. One such example is the O.MG cable,
an Apple Lightning cable for charging an iPhone from a USB source. The
USB connector on the O.MG cable contains an IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi chip that
allows an attacker to take control of the cable and, if the cable is connected
to a Mac computer, provides the attacker an entry with which to exploit the
Mac. The O.MG cable looks identical to the Apple USB Lightning cable.237

Phishing and Watering Hole Attacks
Phishing is a form of social engineering, whereby a message comes from
what appears to be a legitimate source and asks users for some form of
personal, sensitive information—such as name, address, social security or
military identification card number, credit card information, or logon credentials. Phishing is fraud and uses trickery, manipulation, and, in some
cases, intimidation, for its success. The goals of phishing are generally for an
attacker to perpetrate some financial fraud or identity theft, but these same
schemes can also be used for intellectual property theft, access to sensitive
information, or intelligence gathering. Different forms of phishing can be
used to achieve these myriad goals.238
“Traditional” phishing generally refers to attempted fraud by use of an
e-mail containing an urgent message directing the user to a bogus, but legitimate looking Web site. The user is asked for all sorts of personal information
and, upon submission, is typically redirected to the actual legitimate Web
site. Users tricked by this scheme often do not realize that they entered data
at a bogus site.239
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Pharming is a more sophisticated form of phishing. Knowing that many
users look in their browser’s address bar to see if the web address of a page
appears valid, attackers create a two-step attack. In the first step, the local
Domain Name System (DNS)240 name server is manipulated so that a legitimate website’s name is associated with the bogus website’s IP address.241 In
the second step, the user is directed to go to the website. At this point, even
if the user types the address directly into the browser rather than click on
the link, the correct address will appear in the address bar—although the
displayed page will be at the bogus site.242
A spear phishing attack comprises messages specifically directed at
individuals with some form of common interest, such as financial officers,
employees who attended a meeting or class together, etc. Members of the
military are often targeted by spear phishing attacks. For example, news of
some activity is mentioned in the press or information about crew members
of a vessel or team members of a group are somehow acquired by an adversary. Spear phishing messages can be highly personalized and made to be
very convincing. Whaling is a variant of spear phishing, where messages are
directed at senior executives, commanders, or other high-profile individuals
within an organization or unit.243
Not all phishing comes via e-mail. Vishing, or voice phishing, is a phishing scam using the voice network, usually employing a synthesized voice
because these are robot calls. Messages usually tell victims about some activity that requires that they provide their credit card or bank account number;
ask for an immediate callback in order to pay off a non-existent bank debt;
settle a tax judgment from the Internal Revenue Service; or avoid being
arrested. On mobile phones, the caller’s number is often spoofed so that it
appears to come from the same area code as the target. Similarly, smishing, or short message service phishing, uses text messages as the vector for
phishing.244
There are many common themes to phishing messages that cause individuals to provide their personal information, such as:
•
•
•
•
•

there has been a compromise to a credit card or bank account
there is a questionable purchase charged to your account
respond to a bogus confirmation of a purchase
notification of winning a sweepstakes, lottery, gift card, or other award
an unsolicited job offer
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• information required to continue benefits (e.g., Social Security), keep
an account open, receive a tax credit, repair/validate a database, or
avoid going to jail
• requesting information to authenticate your identity and confirm
your continued availability on your local volunteer fire department,
ambulance service, or reserve unit during times of imminent natural
disaster or weather event
Although not a phishing attack, per se, Watering Hole attacks are a
focused form of manipulation that target groups with a common interest.
The attacker starts by gathering intelligence on the target victims to determine or observe what websites the group often frequents; for example, if the
target victims go to the same sports or news website every morning. If the
attacker cannot find such a website, a sophisticated adversary might create
such a website specifically in order to attract the targets to one place.
The next step is for the attacker to somehow insert malware into the
common website. Over time, the malware will infect susceptible user systems. As systems within the target organization get infected, the attacker
can start to access information or otherwise manipulate the compromised
targets. Even groups of users that are resistant to phishing and spearphishing
will be victimized by watering hole attacks because of users’ inherent trust
in the security of websites.245

DoS/distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), Botnets, and Zombies
While traditional malware infects computer systems, there is another form
of attack on the availability of information that can serve the purposes of an
adversary: a DoS. The most secure network in the world with the best data
is all for naught if no one can access the data.
DoS attacks generally succeed against their targets using a resource
exhaustion strategy. Probably the first intentional internet DoS attack
occurred in 1996 when someone started flooding Panix—one of the oldest
internet service providers in the world—with 150 packets per second (70
kilobits per second) of connection requests that were intentionally never
completed. In this way, Panix servers allocated all their memory buffers to
pending connections, which effectively blocked new connections from being
created.246 It was not technically difficult to launch this attack, yet it was so
new at the time that Panix was down for several days while a defense was
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mounted. In 2005, another DoS was launched against Panix when someone
hijacked their domain name, disrupting access to their network for a couple
of days.247
Another form of a DoS attack is to flood the victim’s website with enough
data to consume all the bandwidth on the internet connection. While a
viable form of attack, it only works if the attacker has more bandwidth than
the target.
A problem with any form of DoS, from the attacker’s perspective, is that
the source of the data packets can be traced back to the originator and attribution accurately made. In 1999, the first DDoS attack was used to disable
the computer network at the University of Minnesota for two days.248 In a
DDoS, hundreds or thousands of computers are compromised with malware
that puts them under control of the attacker; these systems are often called
daemons or zombies and the collection of these systems is called a botnet.
When the attacker wishes to launch one form or another of DoS on a victim,
a message is sent to the compromised systems directing them to send their
DoS payload to the victim site. The combined bandwidth of all the zombies
is sure to exceed that of the victim site; two of the largest DDoS attacks to
date occurred within days of each other, in 2018, when GitHub was flooded
with data rates of up to 1.35 terabits per second (Tbps), and Arbor Networks
was flooded with up to 1.7 Tbps.249
The GitHub and Arbor Networks DDoS are worth examining more
closely, as they may represent a harbinger of things to come. These DDoS
attacks employed a method known as broadcast amplification, exploiting a
weakness in software known as memcached. The memory caching daemon or
service on Linux, Unix, and Windows servers is used to cache, or temporarily
store, data in memory in order to speed up processing on large data stores—
such as disks and databases—and is commonly employed in cloud-based
services to reduce response time.250 Because memcached does not employ
authentication, an attacker can send a message to one or more memcached
servers while spoofing the IP address of the intended victim; in these cases,
GitHub and Arbor Networks. An attacker can cause a small amount of data
sent to the target server(s) to be amplified tens of thousands of times when
forwarded to the victim; in this attack, a single 203-byte request resulted in
a 100 megabyte251 response. While patches for this vulnerability are available, studies estimated that there were more than 100,000 known, unpatched
memcached servers on the internet in late 2018. If a nation-state wanted to
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use this form of attack, they could, presumably, leave unpatched servers on
the internet just for this purpose.
One of the biggest dangers from DDoS attacks is that the attacker does
not need to have any special access to the target victim’s network to cause a
disruption or outright blockage. Thus, any operational network is at risk of
this type of attack by an organized adversary. While there are manual and
automatic methods to mitigate the impact of a DDoS attack, there is always a
time lag between the initiation of an attack and the ability of the network to
respond and adapt. A DoS attack can be timed in such a way as to coincide
with a kinetic event, either as part of an offensive or defensive action.

Ransomware
Ransomware is a form of malware that, as the name implies, locks a user out
of a computer system unless the user pays a ransom. While the first form of
malware extortion is thought to be the AIDS Trojan in 1989, modern forms
of ransomware have been around since about 2012; it has been one of the top
forms of cyber malware since about 2016.

Figure 16. Screen shot is shown of WannaCry ransomware. Source: Wikimedia
Commons CC BY-SA 4.0

Ransomware can be distributed as a virus or worm and can target traditional computer systems as well as mobile devices. The ransomware will
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generally encrypt the system’s files or otherwise make the system inaccessible
to the user, and then demand ransom for the user to recover the decryption
key (figure 16). In most cases, the ransom demand requires payment of a certain amount of money within a few days, then doubles for a few more days,
and then expires; this gives users little time to try any decryption efforts,
which generally will fail. Payments are commonly made by anonymous cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Monero. In most cases, the decryption key
is delivered to the victim upon payment because distribution of ransomware
is generally a criminal endeavor and the attacker just wants the money; if
word got out that the key was not distributed, other victims would not pay
the ransom. Note that many forms of ransomware have a help line for the
victim to learn how to create a cryptocurrency wallet and transfer funds.
An alternative form of ransomware is where an attacker downloads sensitive
files and threatens to release them unless a ransom is paid.252

Figure 17. Ransom demand as part of memcached attack payload is shown.
Source: Brian Krebs/used with permission

Nothing limits ransomware to cybercriminals and opportunistic crime.
Consider the memcached DDoS attack described previously. The payload in
some versions of the memcached attack include a ransom note repeated over
and over; figure 17 shows a demand for 50 Monero cryptocurrency that can
be paid to the address shown in the message.253
Ransomware is increasingly used to target health care, financial, and
public sector sites around the world. More than 200 local and state municipalities have been targeted in the U.S. since 2013, in such locations as Albany,
Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Las Vegas, Riviera Beach Florida,
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and San Antonio; indeed, 22 cities in Texas were hit in a single attack in
2019. Nearly 50 U.S. local and state law enforcement agencies have also been
victimized.254 A common thread of these attacks is that—due largely to a
lack of comprehensive disaster recovery and business continuity plans—
their operations ground to a halt, employees lost internet and e-mail access,
departments had to resort to pen and paper, and records were lost.
There is little question that ransomware will continue to be used as a
cyberweapon of nation-states and cybercriminals. The problem will undoubtedly get worse with increased deployment of IoT and smart devices. Hackers
selling ransomware-as-a-service will make these types of attacks easier, more
organized, and more prevalent by any number of bad actors.255

APTs
APTs refers to a cyberthreat that targets a specific organization or sector
and combines all the tools in the hacking toolkit—from social engineering
and exploiting vulnerabilities to phishing and distributing malware. While
the attack might be deflected for a while, the attacker does not go away.256
APTs are so named because each word offers a characteristic of the type
of attack:257
• Advanced. Attackers use a broad array of tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs), employing commercial, open source, and their
own private computer and network intrusion tools; the methodology
is advanced even if the individual tools are not.
• Persistent. These attacks are targeted rather than opportunistic; they
generally employ low-and-slow techniques to avoid detection. The goal
is long-term access rather than short-term disruption.
• Threat. APT actors have the capability and intent to do harm, generally being coordinated actions sponsored by nation-states or highly
organized groups.
The APT term was coined in early 2010 related to an event called Operation Aurora. During the latter half of 2009, Google and reportedly dozens of
other organizations—including Adobe Systems, Juniper Networks, Northrop
Grumman, Symantec, and Yahoo!—were targeted by the Chinese PLA Unit
61398.258 Google claimed that intellectual property had been stolen and
accounts of Chinese dissidents targeted. The attack exploited a vulnerability in Internet Explorer that had been reported to Microsoft in September
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Figure 18. Mandiant’s APT attack lifecycle model is shown. Source: Jurgen Kutscher, “M-Trends 2017–A
View from the Front Lines,” FireEye/used with permission
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2009, but not yet patched. As a result of this attack, Google closed its Chinese
operation.259
As suggested in figure 18, an APT is organized and focused. According
to early analysis of Operation Aurora by Mandiant, there are several distinct
phases in the attack; although this model had been modified over time, the
basics still hold:260
• Initial Reconnaissance. Using public information sources, the
attacker identifies potential targets by learning about the organizational structure, key individuals, servers, the network architecture,
network services and possible vulnerabilities, and other information
posted at the organizational website or social media.
• Initial Compromise. Using TTPs such as social engineering, phishing,
or exploiting a vulnerability on a server system, the attacker inserts
some malicious code that provides an entrée into the network.
• Establish Foothold. Once in, the attacker ensures continued access to
the compromised system by creating a hidden account for themselves
or installing additional utilities or malware.
• Escalate Privileges. Further exploitation of the compromised system
yields the attacker a higher level of privilege, allowing greater access
to systems and data.
• Internal Reconnaissance. Now on the inside of the target network, the
attacker can gain a better understanding of the environment, which
individuals provide the best route to additional data and the location
of key databases and control systems.
• Lateral Movement. Having identified other target computers within
the network, the attacker uses their privilege to move from system to
system via network shares or remote access tools and services.
• Maintain Presence. Once an attacker moves on to a new system,
they can use it to continue learning about the compromised network
environment and to ensure continued access to the environment—
even if their presence is detected on another system. Again, the use
of malware, backdoors, remote access software, and virtual private
network software might be employed.
• Complete Mission. Once the attacker accomplishes their goal—be it
to steal intellectual property, operational plans, organizational information, logistics and personnel information, personally identifiable
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information, or other data—they often allow the active operation to
go dormant, but they leave their access intact in case they wish to
come back later.
APTs are an insidious attack, rarely showing signs of hostile activity in
their early stages. If invoked by a nation-state, these actions are in furtherance of long-term goals; indeed, tomorrow’s adversary might already be
preparing today with APT planning.

Zero-day Exploits
All malware leverages vulnerabilities in software. Software vendors generally
fix vulnerabilities as they are discovered, but the sheer volume of program
errors mean that the vendors must prioritize which flaws get patched and
which ones do not during any given patch cycle. Generally, the most serious
get fixed the soonest; some flaws remain for months or years while others
never rise to a level serious enough to get fixed, unless or until they are
actually exploited.
The term zero-day exploit is applied to malware that exploits a vulnerability that either was unknown or not patched before the malware struck.
In either case, the immediate consequence is that there is no short-term
defense while victims try to gain situational awareness to understand what
is happening.261 Operation Aurora, described previously, is a perfect example.
The attackers against Google and others started in mid-2009 via the exploit
of a previously unknown Internet Explorer vulnerability. Microsoft became
aware of the vulnerability in September 2009 but did not create a patch
for another month or two. The attack against Google essentially ended in
December but was not publicized until January 2010.262
Zero-days have been stockpiled by any number of groups engaging in
offensive information operations, largely sponsored by nation-states. These
groups look for obscure vulnerabilities specifically to weaponize the exploit;
these have become tactical assets to use in strategic cyberattacks, since they
can only be used once to temporarily disrupt an adversary. Most major software vendors have bug bounty programs, paying individuals to find major
flaws in their software; some people will sell vulnerabilities they find to the
highest bidder—or, in some cases, to multiple bidders.263
Perhaps the most public demonstration of the weaponization of zero-day
exploits is the NSA/CIA Toolkit. In 2016, a hacker group called The Shadow
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Brokers announced that they possessed a set of cyberattack tools developed
by the NSA and CIA—including several zero-days that target a wide range
of systems. The Shadow Brokers released the first set of files, called Vault 7,
to WikiLeaks in March 2017 and, subsequently, nearly two dozen more sets
of files were released over the next six months. The tools included hacks and
zero-day exploits for all major operating systems, Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) applications, smart televisions and other IoT devices, and many types of routers.264
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Appendix 5. CPS Tutorial
OT and ICS and IoT, oh my!265

C

PS refers to the engineering problem of merging the physical and cyber
worlds. There are a lot of terms and concepts used when talking about
CPS that all appear to describe the same things, and that will be the focus
of this section.266
OT is an umbrella term that encompasses the various technologies that
enable the cyber and physical worlds to come together (figure 19). OT systems are those where computers directly interact with physical processes by
near-real-time monitoring and/or control of physical devices such as valves,
pumps, production lines, the power grid, dams, transportation systems, and
much more.267
ICS represent a major segment within the OT sector and is composed of
systems used to monitor and control industrial processes, such as factory

Figure 19. The components of CPS and the IoT are shown. Source: Gary C. Kessler
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floor automation, power consumption management of electricity grids,
wind farm controls, or vessel management systems. ICS specifically refers
to computing systems used to manage industrial operations and other CPS
applications as opposed to the more common ICT systems that manage
administrative operations; put another way, ICS controls the physical world
and ICT systems manage data.268
The requirements of ICS software and hardware in an operational environment are quite different than those of ICT systems in a normal business
environment. These differences are primarily found in the characteristics of
performance, system reliability, and security priorities. As seen in table 4,
ICS applications require real-time, low-delay, high-availability hardware and
software. Because of these requirements and the large number of installed
systems, the components need to be thoroughly tested prior to deployment.
Indeed, some of the embedded ICSs are used as part of licensed or regulated
systems, so that any updates and modifications require certification by some
authorizing agency. The implications of system failure—or security vulnerabilities—can also be catastrophic well beyond the device itself, potentially
threatening the environment, safety to people or equipment, or the business
unit’s very future.269
Table 4. Requirements for ICT and ICS. Adapted from: NIST SP 800-82, 2015
ICT

ICS
Performance

Non real-time

Real-time

Response must be reliable

Response is time-critical

High throughput required

Modest throughput accepted

High delay and jitter accepted

Requires low delay and jitter
Reliability

Scheduled operation

Continuous operation (24/7/365)

Occasional failures tolerated

Outages intolerable

Beta testing in field acceptable

Thorough testing prior to deployment

Modifications possible with little paperwork

Formal certification of changes often required

Security Priorities
Risk Impact: Loss of data confidentiality, integrity and availability; business operations

Risk Impact: Environmental, safety, business
operations

Recover by rebooting

Fault-tolerance/redundancy essential
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Figure 20. ICS operation. Source: NIST SP 800-82

Figure 20 shows the architecture of a generic ICS. The core of the system
itself is generally the feedback loop composed of sensors, controllers, and
actuators that manage some controlled process. The sensor measures some
physical property and sends this information as a set of variables to the controller. The controller, in turn, interprets the signals and generates appropriate instructions, based upon some control algorithm and desired set points,
which are sent to actuators. Based on the controller’s instructions, actuators directly manipulate the controlled process via control valves, breakers,
switches, motors, and other physical devices. Much of this activity can be
automated since a human might not be able to respond as quickly as the
system’s changing state demands. Indeed, the human-machine interface
(HMI) is generally for high-level functions such as setting and adjusting
operational parameters for the controller, monitoring system activity, displaying status information, and reviewing system history rather than for
moment-by-moment system control. Diagnostics and maintenance utilities
also provide overall monitoring of the system to prevent, detect, and respond
to abnormal operation or failures.270
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A complete discussion of the myriad uses for ICS is beyond the scope
of this monograph, but suffice to say that such systems vary widely in their
feedback loop timing and response time requirements, geographic distribution, fault tolerance, control complexity, architecture, redundancy, and
impact upon failure.271 Further discussion of ICS will focus on information
relevant to maritime applications.
ICS include a variety of control system configurations, including programmable logic controllers (PLC), distributed control systems (DCS), and
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. A PLC, at its
heart, is merely a special purpose—often ruggedized—computer used to
control hardware devices in an industrial automation environment. The PLC
might be realized as a controller board interface in a computer or, built as
a specialized piece of hardware; in either case, the PLC receives data from
sensors and other input devices, processes the data per some preprogrammed
algorithm, and sends control data to the hardware devices being managed.
The PLC might be a stand-alone device with its own HMI display/keyboard,
or part of a distributed network of PLCs communicating to some central
controller.272
A DCS is a control system for some process that generally includes many
feedback loops distributed amongst many computerized controllers, without
a central management system. A DCS might be built as a set of networked
PLCs, each autonomous but reporting back to a central operator’s HMI station; it is the DCS that provides the logic of the distributed system and the
PLCs are the subsystems that implement the control function.273
Shipboard automation employs ICS, SCADA, and other CPS/IoT standard
communications models. The automated systems employ an HMI with monitors, keyboards, joysticks, touchscreen panels, etc.; a controlling or supervisory computer; PLCs to control the hardware valves, switches, motors, and
other hardware; and a communications network connecting the various
components, primarily using NMEA standards over serial lines, the CAN
bus, Ethernet, wireless, or other media.
SCADA systems provide a central management platform from which
operators can monitor, manage, and maintain situational awareness about a
distributed ICS. SCADA systems integrate data communications, a graphical
HMI, and data acquisition capabilities so that operators can easily observe
the status of the system, quickly detect abnormal activity or system status,
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and intuitively adjust managed processes. The primary components of
SCADA systems are:274
• SCADA display unit, a graphic display HMI showing status messages
and alarms.
• Remote terminal units (RTUs), often geographically dispersed from
the central control station but close to the process being managed or
monitored; a PLC or DCS can act as an RTU.
• A control unit attaches the RTU to the SCADA system, passing data
between the RTU and central controller in real-time with low latency.
• Communication links, ranging from high-speed local Ethernet to
wide-area leased lines or radio.
DCS and SCADA are similar systems but there are a couple of important
differences. First, SCADA assumes a central management point whereas DCS
does not. Second, DCS is process-driven, meaning that it operates sequentially step-by-step, implements the programmed processes, and responds to
inputs by its controller when necessary; SCADA systems are event-driven,
meaning that the system waits for an event to occur that requires an action.
Finally, DCS is intended for a system distributed over a relatively small geographic area; SCADA is designed for exceptionally large geographic areas.275

CPS and IoT Cybersecurity Issues
A typical CPS consists of two primary components—physical devices, and
computers where the computers monitor and/or control the physical devices.
Where there are computers, there are cyber vulnerabilities and the computer
processors that comprise CPS and IoT networks are no exception. ICS are
complex systems prone to vulnerabilities that can be due to the system architecture and design, user policies, configuration and maintenance policies and
procedures, the physical system, software development, and the communication and network configuration. Threats can also come from many sources
including adversarial threat actors; accidental actions by users; structural
failures of equipment, controls, or software; or environmental failures due
to natural disaster, man-made disaster, or external infrastructure failure
outside the control of the system. These threats affect CPS and IoT across
all critical infrastructure sectors, including healthcare, telecommunications, agriculture, energy, and transportation.276 A complete overview of
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cybersecurity threats in this domain is beyond the scope of this monograph,
but a few examples will suffice to demonstrate some of the issues.
While common malware directly attacks computer systems, there are
variants that target hardware via their computer controllers. One of the first
demonstrations of a software attack on hardware was the Aurora Generator
Test conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2007.277
Generators, motors, and other components in many critical infrastructure
sectors—including energy, transportation, oil and gas, and water—employ
digital protective relays that control circuit breakers. These relays ensure that
the hardware remains synchronized and functions within proper operational
parameters. The Aurora test was a controlled hack into a 27-ton generator’s
control system, where relays were disabled, thus holding circuit breakers
open for an amount of time sufficient for the machine to slip out of sync and
subsequently vibrate so violently that it broke itself apart. The test required
less than three minutes to be successful.278
Possibly the first malware in the wild known to attack hardware was
Stuxnet, a Microsoft Windows-based worm that was discovered in 2010. The
Stuxnet worm employed several zero-days exploits and targeted a particular
type of Siemens centrifuge known to be used at Iranian uranium enrichment
facilities. The worm was believed to be initially introduced by USB thumb
drives but also propagated via local networks and, presumably, the internet.
First, the malware targeted only Windows systems. Once on such a system, it
checked for the presence of Siemens Step 7 software, the Windows software
that managed the ICS for the centrifuges. If it found that software, Stuxnet
then compromised the PLCs, accelerating the centrifuges to such a high
speed that they broke apart, all the time showing “normal operation” on the
HMI displays. One of the many lessons of Stuxnet is that it is impossible to
control a malware weapon in the wild; while Iran was the target, only about
59 percent of the victim systems were located in Iran.279 Stuxnet was followed
by more weaponized malware with names such as Duqu, Flame, and Gauss.
Inevitably, there are families of malware that specifically target ICS, such
as CrashOverride and Trisis/Triton, both of which appear to target power
grids and utility systems.280
ICS provide an opportunity to build systems that can respond to abnormal events faster and more efficiently than a human. But these systems need
to be understood by the humans who manage them and, indeed, must provide a way for the human to override the automatic controls should they be
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compromised. Although not a cyber issue, per se, issues with the Boeing
737 MAX 8 provide an object lesson. The 737 MAX is equipped with an
automatic trim system called the Maneuvering Characteristics Automation
System (MCAS). A larger engine on the 737 MAX caused the plane’s stability
characteristics to be different than on previous versions of the 737 and, in
fact, harder for the pilots to fully manage. MCAS was meant to better control
the handling of the aircraft by monitoring an angle of attack (AOA) sensor.
However, in two crashes of the 737 MAX, the system overcorrected, and
the pilots could not override the system. In the crash of Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302, the AOA sensors provided erroneous readings causing the plane
to deviate from a smooth take off. Pilots attempted to regain control, but
the MCAS would then take over again; it appears that the pilots and MCAS
exchanged control of the plane several times during its six-minute flight.281
As noted above, there are billions of IoT devices globally on the internet
and many are not well secured. These devices are an attractive target for an
attacker because they represent incredible computing power as a distributed
network or botnet. The botnet, in turn, can be used as a platform with which
to launch DDoS attacks with incredible bandwidth against their victims.
Due to a desire to keep prices down, IoT devices are largely designed to
depend upon the border security of the network on which they are installed,
leaving the devices themselves prone to weaknesses ranging from insecure
web, mobile, or cloud accessible interfaces, inadequate tools with which to
configure security parameters, and insecure software or firmware to weak
authentication/authorization mechanisms, insecure network services, and a
lack of encryption. The IoT networks themselves have many points of insecurity, including the sensors, communications network, and the back-end
IT systems. While these are generic IoT security concerns, each specific
application and architecture introduces its own security issues.282
The threat of IoT device exploitation is so real that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) released a public warning about potential exploitation
as far back as 2017.283 And the FBI’s warnings were well warranted. There are
sites on the internet that allow people to search the internet for IoT devices,284
and other sites where people can find known or leaked passwords for IoT
devices.285
Due to these weaknesses and vulnerabilities, IoT devices have been compromised and used as part of several large DDoS attacks. One of the best
known was the 21 October 2016 attack against Dyn, a company providing
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internet performance management, name registration, and DNS services. The
Dyn attackers used malware called Mirai, which targeted Linux systems—a
common operating system on IoT processors—and primarily focused on
consumer IoT equipment, such as remote cameras and home routers. The
Dyn DDoS employed a botnet of tens of thousands of compromised IoT
devices, sending an estimated load of up to 1.2 Tbps. Dyn hosts websites for
more than 70 major media, news, commercial, financial, communication,
and other organizations; all were inaccessible for most of a day while Dyn
suffered from three waves of DDoS. While Anonymous and New World
Hackers claimed responsibility for the attack as retaliation for the Ecuadorian embassy in London rescinding Julian Assange’s286 internet access, others
have claimed the attack was perpetrated by script kiddies or an angry gamer.
The real bottom line is that the attack was not technically complicated and
well within the means of almost any hacker.287 IoT botnets using the Mirai
malware were also used to perpetrate DDoS attacks a month earlier against
the KrebsOnSecurity blog (600 gigabits per second) and OVH, France’s largest web host (1.1 Tbps).288

90

Kessler/Zorri: Cross Domain IW Threats to SOF Maritime Missions

Appendix 6. Autonomous Vessel Background
Drivers for Autonomous Vessels
The maritime industry has been engaging in research and planning for the
likely adoption of autonomous vessels for many years. OT and IoT technologies have caught up to the demand so that such vessels are becoming a reality. Given this, autonomous can mean different things to different people;
it is used to refer to highly automated vessels with skeleton crews, remotecontrolled vessels, fully autonomous/unmanned vessels, and hybrids that are
some combination of all of these.289 While most of the work on autonomous
vessels is driven by economic imperatives, practical requirements are also
at play. As an example, due to the travel restrictions brought on by the 2019
Coronavirus disease, Royal Caribbean’s Silversea Cruises conducted remote
control testing during the April 2020 sea trial of a new vessel, Silver Origin.
The captain, on board, acted as lookout while the maneuvering systems
were controlled and calibrated by an operator 1,120 miles (1,800 kilometers)
away.290
For purposes of the discussion in the remainder of this appendix, autonomy will refer to fully autonomous or hybrid remote-control/partially autonomous vessels that do not have a crew on board.291
There are myriad factors that make autonomous vessels attractive to the
industry. One of the biggest is safety; the majority of maritime accidents
are caused by human error and a large number of those errors are due to
fatigue.292 Autonomous vessels with automated controls and responses, possibly including a remote operator, will presumably be able to remain alert on
a 24/7 basis and respond more quickly than humans to unexpected events.293
Vessels can be designed that will carry more cargo than today’s cargo vessels
because they will not need space for people-oriented structures such as decks,
a bridge, and crew quarters, nor will they need environmental systems that
would support a crew. As a result, these ships can be designed to be more
wind resistant and streamlined in the water (figure 21), resulting in a lighter,
more efficient vessel that will be cheaper to operate and use less fuel.294
Autonomous vessels also offer a response to the problem of finding and
attracting trained merchant mariners for the growing commercial fleets. As
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Figure 21. Rendering of an autonomous cargo vessel at sea.
Source: Kongsberg Maritime/used with permission

ships become more and more dependent on computers and other automation,
shipping lines are finding it increasingly difficult to find merchant mariners
with the necessary maritime and technical skills to operate a modern vessel.
At the same time, fewer people from developed nations are looking to the
merchant marine as an attractive career, given the long times at sea away
from friends and family. Indeed, unmanned vessels might also be less prone
to the dangers of piracy due to the fact that there are no hostages to take.295
Without a human on board, a ship’s automated controls and/or remote
operator will be dependent upon numerous technologies. Situational awareness and PNT functions will still require GNSS fixes, weather reports, AIS,
and other communications from other vessels and shore stations. Highdefinition visible-light and infrared cameras, radar, and lidar will supplement these systems by providing a broad picture of the local environment.
These systems become critical when operating in the LZ due to the relative
congestion of shipping, localized hazards, and rapid rate of a changing conditions in these waters.296 Autonomous vessels operating inland, near-shore,
or near congested shipping lanes require far more diligence and attention on
the part of the ship’s master or operator yet the technology systems on which
they must depend have many cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as discussed in
previous chapters.
While advantageous for many reasons, autonomous vessels will also
require operational changes, particularly when an autonomous vessel is
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around other ships—which will have a heightened impact on operations in
the LZ. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers is designed for mariners at sea and neither
for autonomous vessels nor mariners operating from a shore station.297 In
addition, maritime rules of the road are designed for manned vessels; how,
for example, should an autonomous vessel meet the lookout requirement in
Rule 5 of the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea?298
Autonomous vessel-related research is one of the most active areas within
the maritime sector.299 It is likely that full autonomy will start with services
in the inshore or near-shore LZ, such as short haul ferries, autonomous tugboats, and autonomous offshore mooring systems. Autonomous military vessels are already being considered for some routine operations and integration
into battle groups. Autonomous drones will undoubtedly be integrated into
near-shore and inland vessel and port operations, along with autonomous
vehicles at the ports themselves.300 All of this raises the specter of another
USS Cole-like attack occurring in a foreign port with swarms of automated
vessels, drones, or other vehicles.301

Autonomous Vessels in the MTS
The 2010–2020 timeframe saw many research and development initiatives
around MASS, including:
• The European Commission’s Maritime Unmanned Navigation
through Intelligence in Networks project ran from 2012–2015 and
addressed operational, technical, and legal aspects of autonomous
shipping.302
• Rolls-Royce has been an industry leader in MASS research, leading the
Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications (AAWA) Initiative
from 2015 to 2017, with plans for rollout of a small vessel in the early
2020s. The follow-on project, called Safer Vessel with Autonomous
Navigation (SVAN), focuses on implementing the lessons learned from
the AAWA project.303
• Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding were
selected, in 2017, by the Japanese government to lead the development
of an autonomous ocean transport system.304
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• The Novel Inland Water Transport and Maritime Transport Concepts
project is promoting the vessel train concept, where a fully crewed
vessel leads a group of semi-autonomous vessels, all of which are in
communication with the lead ship. Funded by the European Commission in 2017, the research involves 22 companies from nine countries.305
• In 2018, Norwegian shipping companies Kongsberg and Wilhelmsen
established a joint venture called Massterly, with plans to offer the
complete suite of autonomous vessel services including design, development, control systems, logistics, and operations.306
• In 2019, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore launched their
Maritime Innovation Lab to start research and development of several autonomous maritime programs—including vessels, navigation
systems, and situational awareness systems.307
The era is upon us when research leads to the nascent stages of autonomous vessel implementation. In December 2018, Rolls-Royce308 and Finferries
demonstrated the first fully autonomous transit and docking of a vessel with
Falco, a 177-foot (53.8 meter) car ferry in Finland (figure 22). Using results
of the SVAN project, Falco operated in a fully autonomous mode on the one
mile (1664 meter) outbound trip and under remote control on the return;
a captain monitored the vessel from an autonomous operations center 30
miles (50 kilometers) away.309

Figure 22. Demonstration of the first fully autonomous transit and docking of a
vessel, using the car ferry Falco. Source: Finferries/used with permission
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In February 2020, Bastø Fosen, Kongsberg, and the Norwegian Maritime
Authority started a six-month trial running Bastø Fosen VI, a 469-foot (142.9
meter) semi-autonomous passenger and vehicle ferry, on an approximately
seven mile (11 kilometer), 30 minute route. Dubbed the world’s first adaptive
ferry transit, the vessel operates under fully automated control from dock
to dock, with a captain and full crew on board for oversight.310 In another
project, Kongsberg and Yara plan to have Yara Birkeland—a 260-foot (80
meter) electric, autonomous container ship—operational by 2022. This vessel
will transport cargo on an approximately 15 mile (24 kilometer) inland route
in Norway.311

Figure 23. Rendering of the autonomous vessel Mayflower. Source: IBM/ProMare/
used with permission

September 2020 was the 400th anniversary of the Pilgrims departing England on the sailing vessel Mayflower. The fully autonomous vessel
Mayflower is scheduled to start the 3,220-mile (5,182 kilometer) trip from
Plymouth, England to Plymouth, Massachusetts in May 2021 (figure 23).
The Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS) project is a global consortium that
includes IBM, ProMare, the University of Birmingham UK, and the University of Plymouth UK. Mayflower will rely on solar, diesel, and wind power,
and will employ AI, deep learning, and standard maritime technologies to
manage the crossing. This will represent the first trial of a full-sized, open
ocean autonomous vessel.312
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Large autonomous cargo vessels as envisioned by the industry will necessarily change the way in which those ships interact with tugs. As might be
expected, research into the use and deployment of fully autonomous and/
or remote-controlled tugboats is an area of extensive research. Appropriate
autonomy technology might vary whether the tug will operate in ports and
port approaches (harbor tug); at offshore terminals (terminal tug); as an
escort for tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, or large container vessels at
a relatively high speed in port approaches (escort tug); or as an emergency
towing vessel. Autonomous operation of tugs is challenging for many reasons, not the least of which is the way in which two ships affect each other
when in proximity at sea. Given the fact that the tug will be the smaller of
the two vessels, it is the tug that has the higher risk. Indeed, proper use of AI
and ML is as high a priority with tugs as is autonomous controls and navigation. Maneuvering the tug—or a set of tugs—is only the first step; now the
tug needs to connect to the larger vessel. Autonomous tugboat-ship coupling
systems is another area that needs to be developed.313 Tests of autonomous
and remote operated tugs have been underway since 2017 in the North Sea,
Port of Copenhagen, Port of Singapore, and other areas around the globe;
although most have been under relatively optimal conditions, tests in adverse
weather and seas has not yet been performed.314
Another area of research in this sector is autonomous mooring systems,
both in port and at offshore facilities. Autonomous mooring systems can be
used with any type of vessel but have some obvious advantages for autonomous ships; as an example, one such system is being designed specifically for
the Yara Birkeland to provide autonomous mooring as well as autonomous
cargo loading and unloading.315
Although developed independently, autonomous unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs)—or drones—have become a part of autonomous maritime
systems. Both autonomous and remote-control UAVs have been proposed
as aerial surveillance systems to provide additional collision avoidance information and a larger situation awareness perimeter to manned and autonomous ships.316 Autonomous drones have also been proposed to supplement
humans in ship inspections. Drones can safely enter locations on vessels that
might be too dangerous for people—doing everything from transmitting a
video feed for real-time analysis by an inspector or specialized software, to
using high-spectral imaging for detailed analysis beyond the capabilities
of a human.317 Autonomous tugboats and mooring systems might also be
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supplemented by autonomous UAVs for functions such as transporting heaving lines from the dock or tug to a ship.318 All of these functions are likely to
occur in near coastal or inland waters, meaning that mariners are likely to
see more drones in the air, with no real a priori knowledge of their purpose
or intentions. While remote-controlled and autonomous UAVs have some
unique cybersecurity vulnerabilities, they are generically similar to those in
the maritime space.319 Further discussion of cybersecurity issues of UAVs is
beyond the scope of this monograph.
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Appendix 7. Approaches to Qualitative
Risk Assessment
There are two primary methods in which to perform cyber risk assessment:
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative methods are objective and measurable, while a qualitative approach is more subjective and less tangible.
Quantitative methods require the ability to assign value to assets at risk,
which can include the cost of replacement, downtime, repair, negative publicity, etc. These methods also require the ability to predict the frequency
with which assets will suffer loss. This allows the owner to do a cost-benefit
analysis of the actual cost of cyber defense mechanisms versus the anticipated cost of asset loss. The major drawback of this method is that it takes
a long time to do this analysis well, even though it is extremely difficult to
truly know the costs.320
Qualitative methods are scenario-based and work by describing the
events that can go wrong. The assessor can then assign a “grade” based
upon the perceived likelihood of an event occurring and the impact to the
system or organization should the event occur. This type of planning helps
an organization identify strengths and vulnerabilities to create contingency
plans and recovery systems. In the most common usage, the probability of
occurrence is a five-point scale ranging from rare to certainty; severity is
a four-point scale ranging from negligible impact to catastrophic (figure
24). Scenarios considered to be unlikely or that would rarely occur with a
negligible or moderate impact fall into the low level of risk category, which
is numbered four. Scenarios classified with higher likelihoods and/or higher
levels of severity are placed into different risk categories with extremely high
level of risk being the highest, which is numbered one. It is impossible to
eliminate risk, but this qualitative tool assists cyber defenders in identifying
the areas of most vulnerability and in prioritizing allocation of cyber defense
resources to mitigate risk where possible.321
Chapter 5 introduced Tam and Jones’ multi-axis model for autonomous
vessel risk assessment.322 It is a model that focuses on offensive strategy rather
than defensive and could be applied to other aspects of maritime, or even
more general, cybersecurity. Tam and Jones describe three axes, namely
technology (i.e., level of autonomy), attacker reward, and ease of exploit.
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Figure 24. Risk assessment matrix. Source: USCG
Auxiliary, National Response Directorate

Figure 25 shows two of these axes in a two-dimensional chart. Once appropriate scenarios are devised and assigned a tier level (1-5), the scenario can
be classified based upon its placement on the effort-reward chart. Scenarios
in the high reward/low effort quadrant (upper right) are most likely the first
where cyber defense resources should be directed whereas the low reward/
high effort quadrant (lower left) are not areas of greatest vulnerability.
The simplicity of the two-dimensional risk models belies the complexity
of the actual cybersecurity threats. Figure 26 shows all three axes of the Tam
and Jones model in a three-dimension chart. In this particular case, the different technologies do not necessarily add to the difficulty of an attack, nor
the potential reward for the attacker. Thus, it is the entire high reward/low
effort plane that becomes the priority for cyber defense.
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Figure 25. Two-dimension effort-reward chart. Source: Gary C. Kessler

Figure 26. Three-dimension effort-reward-technology chart.
Source: Gary C. Kessler
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Acronyms
AAWA		

Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications

AI		

artificial intelligence

AIS		

Automatic Identification System

AOA		

angle of attack

APT		

advanced persistent threat

ATON		

aid to navigation

C4ADS		

Center for Advanced Defense Studies

C/A		

coarse/acquisition code

CAN		

Controller Area Network

CDMA		

code-division multiple access

CIA		

Central Intelligence Agency

COSCO

China Ocean Shipping Company

COTS		

commercial off-the-shelf

CPA		

closest point of approach

CPS		

cyber-physical systems

DCS		

distributed control system

DHS		

Department of Homeland Security

DDoS		

distributed denial-of-service

DIB		

defense industrial base

DNS		

Domain Name System

DOD		

U.S. Department of Defense

DoS		

denial-of-service
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ECDIS		

electronic chart display and information system

EO		

executive order

EU		

European Union

EW		

electronic warfare

FBI		

Federal Bureau of Investigation

GLONASS

Global Navigation Satellite System (Russia)

GNSS		

Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS		

Global Positioning System

HMI		

human-machine interface

ICS		

industrial control systems

ICT		

information and communications technology

IMU		

inertial measurement units

IoT		

Internet of Things

IP		

internet protocol

ISS		

International Space Station

IT		

information technology

ITU		

International Telecommunication Union

ITU-R		
International Telecommunication Union,
		Radiocommunication Sector
IW		

irregular warfare

LCS		

littoral combat ships

LZ		

littoral zone

MASS		

maritime autonomous surface ships

MCAS		

Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

MEO		

medium earth orbit
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MHz		

megahertz

ML		

machine learning

MMSI		

Maritime Mobile Service Identity

MSA		

Maritime Safety Administration

MTS		

Maritime Transportation System

NMEA		

National Maritime Electronics Association

NSA		

National Security Agency

OT		

operational technology

P(Y)		

precision code (encrypted)

PLA		

People’s Liberation Army

PLC		

programmable logic controller

PNT		

positioning, navigation, and timing

PPS		

Precise Positioning Service

PRN		

pseudorandom noise

RAT		

remote access Trojan

RTU		

remote terminal unit

SA		

selective availability

SAR		

search and rescue

SATCOM

satellite communications

SCADA		

supervisory control and data acquisition

SDR		

software-defined radio

SOF		

Special Operations Forces

SOLAS		

Safety of Life at Sea Convention

SPS		

Standard Positioning Service
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SVAN		

Safer Vessel with Autonomous Navigation

Tbps		

terabits per second

TTP		

tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV		

unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF		

ultra high frequency

UK		

United Kingdom

USB		

Universal Serial Bus

USCG		

United States Coast Guard

USSOCOM

United States Special Operations Command

USV		

unmanned surface vessel

UT		

The University of Texas at Austin

UTC		

Coordinated Universal Time
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